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Security Risk Management of E-commerce Systems 
Abstract: 
Security risk management is a vital part of any system development including e-commerce 
systems. As many people rely on these e-services, its inadequate security measures can be 
experienced, causing great losses to both businesses and customers. This thesis research 
work proposes a procedure that targets e-commerce system security and suggests the 
application of a threat-driven approach to security risk management by analysing an e-
commerce system Webshop as a case study. 
This approach provides a useful assessment of the security risk management procedure that 
is validated by experts in the field. It not only identifies evolving threats to e-commerce 
systems but allows for a structured flow in security risk management. The risk management 
process is documented and reported in such a way that is easily understandable by concerned 
stakeholders of the e-commerce system.  
Keywords: 
Threat analysis, E-commerce, BPMN, ISSRM, STRIDE, Threat modelling. 
CERCS:  
T120 – Systems  engineering, computer technology   
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Elektrooniliste kaubandussüsteemide turvariski juhtimine 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Turvariski juhtimine mängib iga süsteemi väljatöötamisel olulist rolli ja see kehtib ka 
elektrooniliste kaubandussüsteemide kohta. Kuna paljud inimesed kasutavad neid teenuseid, 
võivad nad kokku puutuda ebaadekvaatsete turvameetmetega ja see    on kahjulik nii 
äritegevusele kui klientidele. Antud lõputöö toob uurimistöö tulemusena välja 
elektrooniliste kaubandussüsteemide toiminguid, mis on suunatud turvariskide 
vähendamisele, uurides ja analüüsides Webshop poodi. 
Käsitletav meetod käsitleb turvariski juhtimise strateegiate hindamist, olles selle eriala 
ekpertide poolt kinnitatud ning ei käsitle mitte ainult elektrooniliste kaubandussüsteemide 
potensiaalsete ohtude määratlemist, vaid tagab ka turvariski juhtimise struktureeritud 
kulgemise. Turvariski juhtimise protsess on esitatud sellisel kujul, et ta on asjakohastele 
elektrooniliste kaubandussüsteemide osanikele arusaadav. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Riskianalüüs, elektrooniline kaubandus BPMN, ISSRM, STRIDE, riski modelleerimine. 
CERCS:  
T120 – Süsteemitehnoloogia, arvutitehnoloogia 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The ease that an e-commerce system provides ensures that a large volume of customers will 
continue to use these systems with growing orders made electronically and delivery carried 
out with no geographical limitations. These systems enhance normal business flows as now, 
e-commerce transactions occur between businesses, customers, businesses and customers, 
and so on. A survey of customer’s online shopping habits reveals that more than 5,000 cus-
tomers will make at least two online purchases within a three-month period [10]. According 
to this survey, compared with a 47% purchases in 2014 and 48% in 2015, customers now 
carry out 51% of their purchases online [10]. With the advantage of the possibilities of online 
purchases, businesses which decide to choose the e-commerce option typically show a rise 
in sales [10]. However, the ease introduced by e-commerce solutions has also been accom-
panied by severe cyber threats to the system. Sensitive information is now being generated, 
collected, stored, transmitted, and manipulated on technologies and through processes that 
may not have adequate security capabilities. Customers now fear the loss of financial data 
and e-commerce systems fear the financial losses as well as other losses associated with 
security risks. With these security concerns, a consistent analysis of threats that pose security 
risks, as well as a continuous process into the treatment of these risks. This paper seeks to 
provide a structured and logically illustrated approach to continuous threat analysis and se-
curity risk management specific to the e-commerce domain. This approach will also facili-
tate participation between business professionals (who want to participate in a more effec-
tive way in building, using and managing e-commerce systems), and the IT professionals 
(who seek to work more effectively with the business professionals when building and main-
taining their e-commerce systems). 
1.2 Scope 
This thesis work illustrates how security risk can be managed in an e-commerce system. The 
following section provides specific boundaries/scope of the thesis work. 
Risk management is a general concept, applied to many areas and domains of life, not just 
in Information Systems. Risk management is defined as the “coordinated activities to direct 
and control an organization with regard to risk” [18]. Security risk management, on the 
other hand, has its focus on risks that occur through malicious intent as the word security 
here, defined by [8], is “the degree to which malicious harm is prevented, detected, and 
reacted”. 
Security risk management still covers a wide range of systems of which an e-commerce 
system is one. This work will focus on the Information Systems category. An information 
system, according to [37] is a “system for dissemination of data between persons - poten-
tially, to increase their knowledge”. Data in an e-commerce system could be facts about 
objects on sale, or customer name, age, address, telephone number, account number, pay-
ment card number, or product transactions. E-commerce allows information to flow between 
organizations and external customers, suppliers, and competitors with the aim of carrying 
out a business transaction. 
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E-commerce is generally a buzzword for the use of the internet to facilitate transactions in 
sale and payment of goods and services between parties. These parties can include a number 
of categorizations such as Customer-to-Customer, Business-to-Customer, Business-to-Busi-
ness, Business-to-Government, and so on. However, for the purpose of this thesis work, the 
e-commerce system referred to and focused on, is the Business to Consumer type. This cat-
egory consist of a number of business processes that together achieve the goal of e-com-
merce. The business process that will be further considered is the order management process 
in an online Business-to-Customer (B2C) store. 
An e-commerce system is one comprising several components and interactions with other 
systems. This system comprises of software, hardware, processes, and services, some of 
which could be third-party. Usually, Merchants of e-commerce systems engage third parties 
in carrying out services to support the e-commerce system as commonly seen with Payment 
Solution Providers (PSPs), and Shipping Companies. However, security risk management 
in this paper is only carried out on aspects that are directly under the control of the Business 
to Customer e-commerce system. These third-party agents may be instantiated in models for 
risk illustration but risk mitigations are carried out independent of these third-party systems. 
The STRIDE approach, is used to find possible attacks on the e-commerce scenario may 
come to play. This thesis research will use STRIDE as a threat modelling method not just 
for threat elicitation but as a structure to continue the security risk analysis and treatment 
phase. 
1.3 Problem Description 
The benefits of e-commerce encourage businesses to seek an e-commerce solution for trans-
actions. Thus, e-commerce systems are increasingly being built and business sensitive assets 
are now used on technologies and processes that may not be secure. These technologies and 
processes pose threats, evolving over time, to the e-commerce system. As such, an enhance-
ment to the procedure of following risk management is needed. This should allow for con-
tinuous threat analysis and management of the resulting risk, applicable for the phases of an 
e-commerce system development. 
1.4 Research Question 
For the purpose of this research work, the following main research question is proposed. 
What procedure can be used to carry out risk management with a focus on evolving 
threats to e-commerce systems? 
To be more specific, the main research question is broken up into three areas; 
1. Identification of business context, discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis work. 
2. Threat modeling and risk analysis, discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis work. 
3. Risk treatment procedures, discussed in Chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis work. 
These research areas are further developed into research questions; 
RQ1: How can relevant assets for an e-commerce system be identified? 
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Answering this question reveals how assets that need to be secured in an e-commerce system 
can be identified and also reveals the importance of this identification to the risk manage-
ment process of an e-commerce system. 
 
RQ2: What are the security threats as well as its resulting risk to an e-commerce system? 
After asset identification in RQ1, recognizing system vulnerabilities, threats and the result-
ing impacts and risks are useful in security risk management. 
 
RQ3: What are the risk treatment procedures in risk management for an e-commerce sys-
tem? 
This question will help to understand how to tackle the security issues raised in RQ2. After 
the recognition of threats and the impact of these threats, a decision should be made on 
treating the security risk. Answers to this question will outline the risk treatment procedures 
needed for security risk management.  
The answers to these research questions do not provide a measure for “perfect” security, but 
instead illustrates a procedure that is beneficial to security risk management in an e-com-
merce system. 
1.5 Contribution 
This work follows a design-science research method for information systems research that 
deals with the development of the theories and artefacts to help organisations address busi-
ness needs. With information from existing knowledge base, new artefacts can be developed 
and evaluated, serving as a meaningful addition [15]. 
This thesis contributes to the security risk management research society by applying a struc-
tured threat-driven approach to the information systems security risk management (ISSRM) 
domain model for an e-commerce system. It provides an understanding of its alignment to 
ISSRM methodology expressing assets, threats, risks and risk treatment concepts using 
modelling and analytical tools. The applicability of this approach is shown in an illustrative 
example of an order management process in a Webshop. This proposal will allow a struc-
tured flow from threat analysis to the resulting risk management with focus on a threat-
driven approach. The answers to its research questions will create a viable and engaging 
procedure to risk management in e-commerce systems. This thesis research analysis will be 
useful to both technical and non-technical audiences such as business analysts, business 
stakeholders, system developers, system analysts, and cybersecurity experts. 
The product of this research work will be subjected to evaluation by experts in the e-com-
merce industry as well as experts in related Information Systems. Concepts used in this re-
search such as risk management methodologies and modelling concepts have been previ-
ously demonstrated by academic researchers including Raimundas Matulevičius and Olga 
Altuhhova. 
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1.6 Structure 
The thesis work is organised into eight chapters; 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis research, including its motivation, scope, problem descrip-
tion and research goal for the thesis work. 
Chapter 2 progresses from a discussion on security standards that support ISSRM ap-
proaches, to the use of ISSRM and STRIDE in previous research on security threat analysis 
and risk management. The STRIDE threat-driven approach, an integral part of this thesis 
research will be discussed. 
Chapter 3 highlights the security assets that require protection from malicious activities and 
how can be elicited from the business process of the e-commerce system.  
Chapter 4 deals with the vulnerabilities, a characteristic of the system assets discussed in 
the previous chapter and progresses to illustrate how threats can be modelled from these 
assets leading to the impact on the system that results in a security risk.  
Chapter 5 focuses on risk treatment-related concepts including security requirement elici-
tation in order to mitigate risk.  
Chapter 6 deals with risk measurements including some risk trade-off analysis carried out 
as simultaneously treating all risk is unrealistic. 
Chapter 7 outlines the expert’s validation procedure for the STRIDE based approach to 
security risk management used. 
Chapter 8 highlights the conclusion of the thesis research, its contribution, answers to the 
research questions posed by the thesis work, and a discussion on avenues for future work. 
 
 
  
13 
 
2 Literature Review and Thesis Background 
The area of security risk management research is not novel but rather a long-standing con-
tinuous tradition. This chapter serves as a literature review, introducing security risk man-
agement approaches and its regard to systems related to e-commerce as well as more insight 
into the research design used in this thesis work. Previous work done on the use of ISSRM, 
STRIDE and modelling techniques for security risk management is discussed, providing 
ways of understanding the security need, security threats and the risk management process. 
2.1 Security Risk Management Standards  
A number of standards to manage security risks in information systems of which e-
commerce is one. Security standards define guidelines suitable for security risk management 
which, as a discussion in this section, will first cover an overview of the ISO 2700x series 
[18], NIST publications and the Risk IT framework, and other standards such as PCI DSS 
and IT-Grundschutz. 
The first standard is the ISO2700x standards which for example has the ISO/IEC 
27005:2011, applicable to many organisations, and provides a set of guidelines and 
techniques for information security risk management [19]. It also supports the concepts, 
models, processes and terminologies of information security risk management specified in 
the ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 and aids the satisfactory implementation of security 
following a risk management approach.  
The NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) has published a set of standards 
that address security risks in information system as seen in NIST SP 800-39 [11] and NIST 
SP 800-30 [12]. The NIST SP 800-39 serves as a guide for an organisation-wide program 
for information security risk management using a multi-tiered approach having an 
organizational tier, business process tier and information systems tier [11]. This risk man-
agement approach follows four components to manage risk (1) frame risk; (2) assess risk; 
(3) respond to risk; with these components being addressed in NIST SP 800-30 [12]. This 
standard guides the communication between the risk assessment process and other organi-
zational risk management processes. The NIST publication 200 includes within it, a mixed 
set of security requirements for planning, risk assessment, technical requirements, and even 
physical environment protection requirements. 
The RiskIT framework is part of ISACA’s initiative, based on a set of guiding principles 
based on principles, dedicated to helping enterprises manage IT-related risk [17]. This 
framework complements ISACA’s COBIT by providing a more comprehensive set of good 
practices to identify, govern and manage IT risk for business-driven IT-based solutions and 
services. Thus, the Risk IT Framework enhances risk management for organisations that 
adopt COBIT as their IT governance framework. The Risk IT framework bridges the gap 
between generic risk management standards such as the ISO and domain-specific 
frameworks providing a comprehensive view that enables enterprises to understand and 
manage significant IT risk types [17]. 
One other standard particularly relevant for e-commerce systems is the Payment Card In-
dustry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) standard is more of a compliance standard specific 
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to financial and e-commerce systems [29] and applies to those processing payment card data 
for transactions. As e-commerce systems use payment cards for transactions, the system and 
third-party connections must be PCI-DSS compliant [29]. This standard lists guidelines that 
should be followed in order to be compliant as a failure to meet the standard inevitably leads 
to steep fines, a damaged reputation and loss of customers. Thus, this should be considered 
during security risk management. These guidelines include Public Key selection, the use of 
encryption and digital certificates, and choosing PCI compliant hosting provider.  
Other standards exist such as the IT-Grundschutz (a German standard for security 
management methods). However, discussions on the standards for security risk management 
serve as a basis to define security risk management methodologies to be used in specific 
domains of information systems. Methodologies will combine the principles proffered by 
the standards discussed in a perspective and guidance for security procedure within the spe-
cific domain. 
2.2 ISSRM Security Risk Management Methodology 
A security risk management methodology is an analytical procedure that follows security 
standards to identify valuable system assets, stakeholders and operations, as well as the risk 
levels of undesirable events with the aim of providing logic and guidance for identifying 
and implementing solutions for the specific risk situation and mitigation strategies. In order 
to achieve this, methodologies have been developed [20]. For this reason, the ISSRM meth-
odology [6], its domain model, its concepts, relationships, metrics and risk management 
process will be discussed. 
2.2.1 Domain Model 
A domain model is developed through a survey of security and security risk management 
related standards and methods, introduced to guide activities of risk management by the 
people working on them [6]. The domain model for ISSRM characterizes three key con-
cepts: the asset-related concepts, the risk-related concepts and the risk treatment-related 
concepts: marked correspondingly as blue, orange and green in Figure 1. 
The asset-related concepts describe the assets that need to be protected according to the 
security need of the system. The business asset is defined as any information, process or 
skill necessary for achieving the business objectives of a system with its security need 
characterised by security criterions of confidentiality, availability, and integrity and wholly 
supported by IS assets. 
The risk-related concepts demonstrate how risks are reached through a combination of 
threats (consisting of threat agents that use attack methods to execute threats) exploiting on 
one or more vulnerabilities that are a characteristic of IS assets, leading to a considerable 
impact that harms assets and negates the security criterions of the business assets. 
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Figure 1: ISSRM Domain Model [20] 
 
The risk treatment-related concepts include decisions to treat risk based on analysis done 
on controls that implement security requirements which serve to mitigate risk and thus refine 
the risk treatment process. 
2.2.2 ISSRM Process 
This process describes activities that are necessary for security risk management as seen in 
Figure 2. The first step is the context and asset identification which analyses the organisa-
tion, its environment, as well as its assets. Next, the security objective determination based 
on the confidentiality, integrity and availability of each business asset is carried out. The 
third step is risk analysis and assessment to identify and estimate risks. After these stages, 
in case of an unsatisfactory assessment for reasons such as missing assets, or a change in 
scope, these three processes can be iterated. 
The risk treatment stage includes decisions to treat the security risk developed. The security 
requirements definition stage is necessary to state security conditions that need to be true in 
order to achieve security of the system based on known risk situations. In the event of un-
satisfactory treatment results, there could be a need to iterate from the beginning of the 
ISSRM process, or from the risk analysis and assessment stage. 
The security selection and implementation stage define specific technologies needed to be 
implemented within the system. 
2.1 Previous Work on Security Risk Management 
The use of the ISSRM methodology and its Domain Model for risk management and as a 
reference to the enhancement of risk management procedures is not a new topic, as there 
has been previous research works done on this. This work is based on the notion that ISSRM 
and its Domain Model is a reliable methodology that can be used in a security risk manage-
ment process and as a guiding reference when developing concepts that enhance the security 
risk management process.  
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Figure 2: ISSRM Process [20] 
This work is also based on the notion that the STRIDE method is a viable method for threat 
analysis in the security risk management process. Three research works are discussed here, 
with two illustrating how ISSRM and its Domain Model is used as a security risk manage-
ment process and as a reference when applying concepts that enhance the security risk man-
agement process. The third work highlights the use of STRIDE in security risk management. 
2.1.1 Analysis of Digital Security Threats in Aviation Sector 
This is a research work by [38] illustrating the use of the ISSRM methodology and its Do-
main Model in the Aviation Sector specifically for the Airline Turnaround Process. This 
research was carried out as a continuation of another master thesis work - “Service Broker-
ing Environment for an Airline” which demonstrated how an organization could transform 
its business processes to enable enterprise collaboration. The research work by [38] was 
done by following a scientific approach to ISSRM in solving the security issues in the Air-
line Turnaround process caused by collaboration between airlines and service providers in 
the aviation sector. The approach composed of three steps;  
(i) identify assets that are involved in the collaboration,  
(ii) determine the risks by exploring the risk components of the identified assets, and 
(iii) apply security requirements and controls to mitigate the risks on these assets.  
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The research work also included an evaluation performed to establish how security require-
ments and controls reduced the risks, including a simulation to illustrate its validation pro-
cess. By using an approach in line with the ISSRM methodology, the research work provided 
a way to counter threats relevant to the aviation sector showing evidence in simulations that 
illustrated a significant risk reduction. 
2.1.2 Securing Airline Turnaround Processes using Security-Risk Ori-
ented Patterns 
Here, the ISSRM methodology was used as a foundational reference when combining spe-
cific concepts that aid enhancements in the aspect of security risk management in infor-
mation systems. This research work [37] focused on the use of security risk-oriented pat-
terns, developed using the ISSRM methodology domain model also for the purpose of se-
curing the Airline Turnaround process. As software programs generally tend to run into 
similar problems, errors and attacks that may not require new solutions, a security pattern is 
useful in describing particular recurring security problem arising in a specific security con-
text, and providing a generic scheme for a security solution. 
Although there are numerous classification systems used to categorize security patterns for 
the purpose including resources for threat patterns such as CAPEC [4] and STRIDE [22], 
this research work focuses on the use of Security-Risk Oriented Patterns to find security risk 
occurrences in business processes and also present mitigations for these risks. It was prof-
fered that by using this approach, business analysts will be provided with means to elicit and 
introduce security requirements to business processes whilst reducing the efforts needed for 
risk analysis and risk management. 
2.1.3 Online Banking Security Analysis based on STRIDE Threat Model 
This paper [40] carries out a system threat analysis method that combines the STRIDE threat 
model and threat tree analysis in such a way that improves the efficiency of threat analysis 
and also provides practicability. As there was a lack of systematic and holistic procedures 
in the use of threat tree for threat analysis, they apply the STRIDE threat model to the online 
banking system. This was done by carrying out an analysis of business assets, constructing 
a STRIDE threat model to identify threats and establishing a threat tree. It is proffered that 
applying this method to the online banking system threat analysis can provide guidance for 
system security analysis and evaluation. 
From the research works discussed in sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.1.3, it can be seen that; 
- The ISSRM approach and its Domain model is a viable methodology that is used in 
security risk management. However, not enough work has been done on a method 
that focuses on threat analysis within the ISSRM methodology, allowing for a more 
consistent threat analysis to risk management procedure while following the guide-
lines of the ISSRM methodology and its Domain model. 
- The STRIDE threat analysis is useful in providing a systematic procedure to threat 
analysis. However, a structured approach following from threat analysis to risk treat-
ment in a security risk management process, following the ISSRM methodology, has 
not yet been carried out. 
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2.2 Model Representation for Security Risk Management 
As system software development and maintenance for business continuity typically involve 
different stakeholders with different goals, needs, requirements and system expectations 
[27], addressing different viewpoints and coming to some agreement about them is a chal-
lenge. The use of various modeling techniques to illustrate these ideas in a consistent and 
coherent manner becomes helpful. 
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) is a business-friendly language for con-
structing business process models. BPMN has been aligned with the ISSRM domain model 
as seen in research by [1] and thus, could be used for security risk management although the 
BPMN language was not explicitly dedicated to security modeling. Constructs of the lan-
guage when oriented to security have been documented in research by [1] and [20]. 
Understanding the business process is the first step that allows the analysis of business needs 
(which security is a part of). With security considered, stakeholders can be aware of potential 
security threats, analyze risks and its impact and then design and implement appropriate 
countermeasures that will improve secure system development and functionality in the 
future. As such, models are a way to communicate the system to be built and so making a 
model of the system, aids discovery of threats without getting bogged down with too many 
details.  
This security risk-oriented BPMN language is being used for this thesis research for the 
purpose of illustrating asset identification and elicitation, security requirements implemen-
tation and security countermeasures. 
2.3 Threat-driven Perspective to Security Risk Management 
Threat modelling in security risk management is more than one activity in the chain of dis-
covering and mitigating security risk, as it begs the question of what is being built, what can 
go wrong when it is built, what should be done when things go wrong and if the analysis 
carried out is useful [33]. These threats are not to be discovered haphazardly, but in line with 
the vulnerability that it can exploit, depending on the system assets available, that serve to 
make sure that the business assets run as intended. The systematic discovery of threats in 
relation to the system domain, following a structured process to discovering the risks posed 
by these threats in order to develop security risk treatment procedures that aim to mitigate 
the risks whenever it arises is the purpose of this threat-driven perspective used in the re-
search work. 
Threat modelling, in some ways is like programming with no one ideal language for all tasks 
and so, there is no one way to handle threat modelling [33]. One method to threat modeling 
was introduced by [22] was STRIDE. In this research work, a STRIDE threat-based ap-
proach for security risk management considers the following as seen in Figure 3; 
- The system being built, represented by its business process using the common 
BPMN notation language. 
- What can go wrong, elicited using the STRIDE method; 
- What should be done when things go wrong, as illustrated in the risk management 
procedures carried out based on the STRIDE threats and then risks elicited;  
- The validation of the analysis by experts. 
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This approach is in line with the ISSRM procedure of first identifying the assets through 
context and asset identification to discovering the threats using a STRIDE based method 
which takes much into consideration, the security objective determination of the system, and 
proceeds to a structured elicitation of the impact of the threat and the resulting risk through 
risk analysis and assessment. The approach then moves forward to address the risk that has 
been elicited through risk treatment procedures, security requirements definition and con-
siderations in the selection of controls and implementation. Being in line with ISSRM, the 
approach also follows the domain model in its structure. 
 
 
Figure 3: Threat-driven Approach 
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As this threat-driven approach to be used is based on STRIDE, there is need to elaborate on 
why STRIDE was chosen. STRIDE is a mnemonic that stands for Spoofing, Tampering, 
Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege [36]: 
- Spoofing: pretending to be something you are not or someone you are not [33]. Here, 
an attacker might pretend to be a legitimate customer accessing a Webshop, so there 
must be a way to authenticate Customers.  
- Tampering: modifying something that you are not supposed to modify [33]. Here, 
an attacker might tamper with the data as it flows back and forth the Webshop server.  
- Repudiation: claiming you didn’t do something (regardless of if this is true or not) 
[33]. In this case, is there the presence of system logs, collated with the right infor-
mation, protected against tampering? 
- Information Disclosure: exposing information to those who are not authorized to 
view it [33]. In this case, what happens if a Customer is able to access information 
concerning other Customers in the Webshop? 
- Denial of Service: attacks that are designed to prevent a system from providing its 
intended service by crashing it, slowing it down, or filling up its storage [33]. So, 
what could happen if a thousand customers connect simultaneously to the Webshop 
when there is news of huge discounts? 
- Elevation of Privilege: when a program or user can to do things (technically) that 
they’re not supposed to be able to do [33]. If the customer web front-end is the only 
way for a Customer to access the Webshop, are there controls to enforce that? 
STRIDE helps to find, recognize and model these threats on a system. The application of 
STRIDE has been known to be easy to use, produce a significant number of threats for 
analysis and result in the relatively high number of correctly determined security threats 
[41].  
There are other classifications of threats that have been identified such as one by Uzunov 
and Fernandez in [5]. This type of classification presents a security threat taxonomy for 
distributed systems by separating between system threats and the threats to the security of 
the infrastructure of the system thereby coming up with eight classes of system threats (iden-
tity attacks, network communication attacks, network protocol attacks, passing illegal data 
attacks, stored data attacks, remote information inference, loss of accountability, and uncon-
trolled operations) and four classes of threats to the security of the infrastructure of the sys-
tem (cryptographic attacks, countermeasure attacks, configuration/administration attacks, 
and network protocol attacks) [20]. However, these methods have as a priority, the classifi-
cation and categorization of threats, over its elicitation. Another method for threat modelling 
is the use of attack trees that provide a way of describing the security of systems based on 
various attacks that could possibly occur [32]. An attack tree relevant to the system being 
built is helpful in identifying threats; however with complex systems, using attack trees may 
become distracting or tedious. Also, attack trees lack some of the structure that STRIDE 
contains that is more beneficial for the risk management procedure.  
So, for the purpose of this thesis research, STRIDE would be focused on. The selection of 
the STRIDE approach is because of its suitability to the concerned system and how easy it 
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is to elicit threat scenarios.  Also, each of the STRIDE scenarios is the opposite of security 
properties a system should have which are; 
- Spoofing – Authentication 
- Tampering – Integrity 
- Repudiation – Non-repudiation 
- Information Disclosure – Confidentiality 
- Denial of Service – Availability 
- Elevation of privilege – Authorization  
This thus covers the security needs of any system with authentication, authorization and 
non-repudiation being secondary security properties. The connection of each STRIDE mne-
monic to security property is also used for risk mitigation, as it guides the system stakehold-
ers on how to mitigate the risks under each category by for example, implementing authen-
tication mechanisms to treat spoofing risks. This reveals the scope covered by STRIDE and 
how useful it is in finding attacks in a system. The thesis research does not use STRIDE 
mainly as a categorization but also to elicit threats. Thus, carrying out threat elicitation into 
a structured approach to security risk management in the system is focused on. 
One element not well covered in STRIDE is the identification of vulnerabilities and so for 
this, a taxonomy of vulnerabilities in software systems will be used as discussed in [35]. 
Also, in finding threats, STRIDE may be too high level and thus may not provide a detailed 
list of attack patterns to identify threats. These can be done using attack libraries such as 
CAPEC and OWASP Top Ten [27]. CAPEC [4] (MITRE’s Common Attack Pattern Enu-
meration and Classification) has a highly structured set of about 476 attack patterns that 
have been organised into 15 groups is highly useful in this case. Also, the OWASP Top Ten 
list is a list with well-balanced attacks and backing information including threat agents, at-
tack vectors, security weaknesses, technical and business impacts as well as vulnerability 
and mitigation details for the attack. Both the OWASP Top Ten and CAPEC serve as posi-
tive supplements to STRIDE. For security countermeasures, the security standard NIST SP 
800-53[13] has within it, items that also aligns with one or more of elicited STRIDE threats. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed the risks in e-commerce systems as well as security risk management 
approaches available that target the risk management issue with security standards. The 
ISSRM approach and its domain model is provided as the preferred methodology for dealing 
with security risks in information systems. Previous work using the ISSRM methodology 
and STRIDE for security risk management activities were analysed to form the background 
of the thesis work. This opened a discussion on the threat-driven approach to security risk 
management in line with the ISSRM methodology and its domain model.  STRIDE was 
introduced as the driver for threat modelling providing a consistent and structured risk man-
agement procedure in the midst of evolving threats. Also, security risk-oriented BPMN lan-
guage introduced as being used to aid security risk illustrations.  
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3 Assets in E-commerce System 
This Chapter seeks to answer the RQ1 – How can relevant assets for an e-commerce system 
be identified? In order to answer this, the following questions are necessary; 
RQ2.1: What can be used to identify and elicit assets in an e-commerce system? 
RQ2.2: What are the assets that pose security concern in an e-commerce system? 
RQ1.3: What is the importance of asset identification to risk management procedure? 
By providing answers to these questions, the identification of relevant assets to an e-com-
merce system can be illustrated. 
3.1 The E-commerce System and its Components 
E-commerce refers to the transactions of buying or selling of products or services over the 
Internet and this is becoming popular because of its ease of use and convenience. Over the 
years,  there has been a notable broadening of the online product types from books, computer 
software and hardware which had dominated e-commerce to including fashion (shoes, 
clothes, and jewelry.), household goods, toys and so on [24]. Today, many e-commerce 
websites may choose to specialize in some type or category of a product such as fashion, or 
sell a wide range of products as previously listed, such as which is seen in the popular e-
commerce website, Amazon. A lot of popular e-commerce activities are directed at custom-
ers (Business to Consumer (B2C) type) as in the case of online retail stores and this e-com-
merce type will be focused on in this thesis because this deals with a lot of transactions that 
involve a significant portion of individuals, giving away sensitive information.  
For the purpose of further analysis, defining what an e-commerce “system” refers to is im-
perative. In a practical setting, a system can be understood as a set of correlated phenomena, 
involving the following [20] with examples as refers to a B2C e-commerce system; 
i. a product, service or a component (e.g., clothing, electronics, food order service 
or car rental service), 
ii. the infrastructure needed to combine the products or components (e.g., Webshop 
website and warehouse), 
iii. the applications that are used to support activities (e.g., customer browser, Web-
shop server, Webshop payment system, and Webshop inventory system), 
iv. information technology staff who support the above-mentioned components 
(e.g., Webshop server administrator) 
v. internal employees, management, and third-party entities, who use the technol-
ogy to achieve the business goal (e.g., Webshop Customer Support, Webshop  
Merchant, Shipping company, and Payment Service Providers) 
vi. Webshop customers and other external users, who buy products and use services 
of the system. 
From the above explanation, an e-commerce system can be seen as much more than a web-
site, a customer and a merchant. Security asset-related concepts in an e-commerce system 
will follow an understanding of the e-commerce system, its security objectives, and its pro-
cesses to then enumerate its security assets (business and system assets).  
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3.2 Security Objectives in an E-commerce System 
When security risks are considered, this implies the acceptance of a security need in the 
system. The security objective is a property that describes the security need of a system, 
typically expressed through the security objectives which are security characteristics of busi-
ness assets. An e-commerce system, like any information system has the following security 
objectives; 
Confidentiality: this describes the state in which data is protected from disclosure to parties 
that are unauthorised to view it. For example, loss of confidentiality occurs when a Customer 
username and password is disclosed to parties other than the Customer. 
Integrity: this describes the state in which data is not altered or modified either due to mali-
cious intent (intentional sabotage of Webshop Storage) or accidentally. 
Availability: this describes the fact that authorised persons can access business assets within 
the appropriate period of time. For example, a Webshop product list must be made available 
24/7 to Customers. 
A security objective is a property of the business assets and it is possible that a security 
criterion can be a constraint of several different business assets, or not constraint any of them 
as one or several security criteria can be needed to assess the significance of risk. However, 
if a security criterion concerned by none of the risks, in that case, there is no relevant impact 
for this criterion. There are other security criteria which may be added when the context 
requires and are deemed secondary. They are;  
Non-repudiation: this is a form of accountability and assurance on the business asset de-
scribing the proof of the integrity of the concerned business asset. 
Authorisation: describes permissions on the business asset for the purpose of creation, mod-
ification, retrieval and deletion. For example, checkout service can only be carried out by a 
legitimate Customer of the Webshop. 
Authentication: describes a verification of the identity of the supplied business asset, which 
if successful grants a defined level of access. 
These primary and secondary security criterions are the basis for the STRIDE threat model-
ling approach. 
3.3 The E-commerce Order Fulfilment Business Process 
Knowing the business process is a significant aspect of managing security risks in any sys-
tem. The business process illustrates the context of the organization, the assets involved and 
its activities as seen and understood by a business analyst [3]. It is possible to extract the 
business process by following the logical flow of how the application should work in order 
to fulfill its purpose. This was discovered through a study of popular e-commerce retail 
websites to discover a general application workflow to achieving its purpose which is in this 
scope – order fulfillment. The major processes discovered are highlighted in Figure 4 [14]; 
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Figure 4: Value Chain 
In Figure 4, the value chain consists of the main value – an order, which is created as a result 
of the process steps. The process begins with viewing the product, provided by the Product 
Catalog process. After a product is selected, it is added to the Shopping Cart where it is 
prepared for checkout. The Payment process allows for the selected product to be purchased 
and then the Shipping process takes the product to the Customer which completes the order. 
These processes are collectively shown in Figure 9. 
3.3.1 Product Catalog 
The product catalog or product list as seen in Figure 5, details product information needed 
to present any product to the customer and complete the transaction. Any company that 
seeks to sell products via e-commerce will contain this process. This product information 
consist of the product price, product description, product image, product identification num-
ber, product choices, options (color, size, and weight) and availability of the product [14]. 
This process must ensure the provision of correct information about the product. 
3.3.2 Shopping Cart 
Online shopping carts are much equivalent to the real-world shopping carts; both allow 
shoppers to set aside selected purchases in preparation for checkout. The shopping cart pro-
cess, illustrated in Figure 6, allows customers to select a product, review selected products, 
edit selections as necessary, remove selection, and then actually make the purchase by click-
ing checkout button [14]. Finally, the checkout procedure allows the customer select prod-
ucts from the shopping cart that the customer intends to buy at the moment. This could be 
all the products available in the cart and also partial products in the cart. This process also 
prepares the necessary information needed to the next process which is the payment process. 
Information concerning the shopping cart process is automatically stored in the database. 
3.3.3 Payment Process 
The shopping cart process, typically works in conjunction with the payment process illus-
trated in [14]. During payment, a customer provides his/her payment card details after being 
directed to the payment gateway and this information is sent to the bank. The bank checks 
the customer’s account and can either authorize the payment or not. This operation, if ap-
proved, allows the bank to send approval notification to the customer and perform the order 
transaction and transfer payment to the merchant account. If this operation is denied, the 
customer is notified that the transaction cannot be completed. After a successful payment 
process, information is sent to the merchant to start the shipping process.  
Usually, to make purchases on the e-commerce platform through checkout, a user should 
already be registered and logged in to the site. This is true of many popular e-commerce 
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sites such as Amazon and eBay. The data provided during registration will include infor-
mation needed for identifying the user during account login and for shipping, billing and 
fraud-mitigation purposes. 
 
Figure 5: Product Catalog Process 
 
Figure 6: Shopping Cart Process 
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Some e-commerce sites have decided to provide a way to skip this procedure if the customer 
does not wish to complete registration. This is done for a number of reasons such as the 
reduction of shopping cart abandonment, allowing the customer to carry out transactions as 
guest. If this procedure is applied to a Webshop, it benefits the security objective of confi-
dentiality as the Webshop will not store the provided personal information thereby reducing 
the impact of attacks that seek to collect sensitive information from the Webshop.  
Both procedures have its pros and cons, but for the purpose of this research work, the focus 
is on Webshops that use only registration procedure. 
3.3.4 Shipping 
This process as illustrated in Figure 8, allows the customer’s purchased product to be sent 
out to the customer using a defined shipping method. The choice of shipping method can be 
defined at the point of checkout or may be one predefined by the Merchant. The shipping 
process is reached after notification of purchase and payment information has been received 
by the merchant. The merchant makes the purchased product ready for shipping and sends 
it out to the defined user shipping address. From the information provided, a merchant can 
now [28]; 
1. Determine which products to package and the total size and weight and makes it 
ready for shipping. 
2. Confirm the shipping destination from customer-provided data. 
3. Determine the shipping carrier to be used, sometimes selected by the customer or 
enforced by the merchant. The shipping cost is usually paid during checkout. 
4. Send the product out via the shipping carrier to the customer. 
Also, this process also involves user confirmation of having received the product, customer 
rating of product and in some situations, returns and refund process. 
3.4 Security Assets in an E-commerce System 
In section 3.1 the e-commerce system was defined, showing its major components and in 
section 3.2, the functionality of e-commerce business process was discussed, demonstrating 
the assets involved which will aid modelling in a way that is easier to understand by business 
analysts. On the other hand, the system assets of an e-commerce system can be seen in ma-
terial and tangible elements of an e-commerce system components as well as the business 
processes explained in section 3.3. Human beings that deal with e-commerce processes can 
also be classified as system assets [20] which include Customers, internal employees of the 
e-commerce system (e.g., Webshop Merchant). For each business process function (business 
asset) there are two or more system assets that support these functions. These system assets 
are also characterized by the vulnerabilities which are exploited in the event of a threat and 
results in security risks. For example, a Merchant can be vulnerable to social engineering 
threat and an Input interface can be vulnerable to SQL Injection – an input validation threat. 
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Figure 7: Payment Process 
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Figure 8: Shipping Process 
Business assets for the scope of this research work can be derived from the business process. 
The use case below describes the business process of the Webshop in the following steps, 
of which the Webshop order fulfilment process itself can be considered a business asset; 
1. The Webshop Customer opens the Webshop website. 
2. The Customer requests for the product list.  
3. The Webshop receives the product list request. 
4. The Webshop displays the product list.  
5. The Customer selects product and quantity. 
6. The Customer sends product selection confirmation. 
7. The Webshop receives product selection confirmation. 
8. The Webshop adds selected product and quantity list to cart 
9. The Customer requests checkout. 
10. The Webshop receives customer checkout request. 
11. The Webshop proceeds to checkout. 
12. The Webshop checks if the customer has account? 
13. If the customer does not have an account with the Webshop, the Webshop will 
carry out registration procedure. 
29 
 
14. If the customer has an account with the Webshop, the Webshop skips registration 
procedure. 
15. The Webshop will carry out login procedure. 
16. The Webshop requests shipping details. 
17. The Customer enters shipping details. 
18. The Webshop will go to payment gateway. 
19. The Payment gateway asks for payment details. 
20. The Customer enters payment details. 
21. The Payment gateway checks payment details received from the customer. 
22. The Payment gateway sends payment response to the Webshop 
23. The Web Shop receives payment response from the payment gateway 
24. The Webshop checks payment gateway response. 
25. If the response is negative, payment process fails. 
26. If response is positive, the Webshop will notify Customer of payment response and 
payment send payment notification to merchant. 
27. The Customer views payment response. 
28. The Merchant receives payment notifications and payment. 
29. The Merchant will process customer order. 
30. The Merchant ships out order to Customer and sends order shipped notification to 
the Webshop. 
31. The Customer receives the order. 
32. The Customer sends order confirmation to the Web Shop. 
33. The Customer gives product rating for order. 
34. The Webshop receives customer product rating for order. 
35. Order completed. 
From this use case, it is possible to elicit the system assets that support business assets. The 
following system assets will support business assets further down in the research work. 
1. Product: Webshop 
2. Infrastructure: Webshop Website  
3. Applications/components used to support activities: Webshop Server, Webshop 
Storage, Webshop API, and Webshop Login Interface. 
4. IT Staff: Webshop Admin 
5. Customers: Webshop Customer  
The Webshop is the name given to the e-commerce application in this case. It provides a 
graphical user interface seen as the Webshop Website and displays, collects and manipulates 
input provided from the Webshop Customer, and the Webshop Admin. The Webshop appli-
cation consists of a Webshop Server that processes requests sent to the Webshop from exter-
nal systems such as login requests or checkout requests. For the collection of input particu-
larly for login purposes, the Webshop uses its input interface – the Webshop Login Interface. 
The Webshop is administered using the Webshop Admin Interface. Other system assets used 
by the concerned Webshop includes Webshop API used for development purposes for the 
Webshop and the Webshop Storage for storing business sensitive data.  
    
 
 
Figure 9: E-commerce Webshop Business Process 
 (This is the structured perspective of the model, low fonts of labels are left intentionally) 
Product Catalog Process 
Shopping Cart Process 
Payment Process Shipping Process 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the security assets in an e-commerce system and the methods of identifying 
these assets were discussed. These assets were identified through a study done to develop a 
business process illustrating the business specific assets as well as their supporting business 
assets. As an e-commerce system Webshop contains many complex processes, one process 
– the order fulfilment process, was considered and the security assets elicited accordingly. 
Security objectives, a security characteristic of the business assets of a system, were also 
discussed, introducing these criterions as the basis for the STRIDE modelling approach. 
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4 Security Risk in E-commerce Systems 
This chapter provides answers to the RQ2 – What are the security threats as well as its 
resulting risk to an e-commerce system? In order to answer this, the following questions are 
necessary; 
RQ2.1: What are the vulnerabilities of assets in an e-commerce system? 
RQ2.2: What method can be used to identify security threats to an e-commerce system? 
RQ2.3: What are the impacts of security threats that result in risks in an e-commerce sys-
tem? 
With these questions answered, information about vulnerabilities of the system assets dis-
covered in Chapter 3, e-commerce threats, impacts and the resulting risk scenario can be 
illustrated. 
4.1 E-commerce Risk Landscape 
E-commerce is a profitable target. For example, large payment processing firms, have a 
significant risk of fraud (being up to 0.9 %) and even though e-commerce fraud rates have 
become stabilized in recent years—due, in part, to retailers’ increased vigilance—in 2009 
merchants still lost about $3.3 billion to online fraud [34]. 
The e-commerce industry suffered, losing customer trust and customer base, with various 
payment gateways and bank authorization processes vulnerable to attacks such as man-in-
middle attacks. A simple denial of service (DoS) attack could result in online stores or por-
tals being inaccessible and undoubtedly interrupts the online business activities. The most 
serious of these scenarios are those that involve the theft or destruction of customer’s sen-
sitive information. Others could be website spoofing, payment card information theft, mal-
ware attack (using Trojans, viruses, worms, and bots), hacker infiltration, vandalism, and 
identity theft. These attacks leave lasting effects on the targeted e-commerce platform. At-
tacks against Top B2C e-commerce establishments especially online retail stores have con-
sistently remained at breach levels of severe (7 – 8.9) to catastrophic (9 – 10) as seen in 
Table 1 [58] with breaches involving personally identifiable information of customers, 
transactional data, and credit card information. 
Relevant risks in information systems, given its prevalence and the business’s dependence 
on it, should be analyzed. The development and use of security risk scenarios is a core ap-
proach to bring realism, insight, some organizational engagement, improved analysis and 
structure to the complex matter of security risk [25]. A security risk scenario can be seen as 
a security event that can lead to a business impact, when and if it should occur. Thus, for 
security risk scenarios to be complete and usable for assessment, they should contain the 
following components, illustrated in the domain model; 
 Vulnerability of system asset 
 Threat agent 
 Attack method 
 Resulting threat 
 Threat Impact 
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Table 1: Top Retail Data Breaches in Retail [3]  
Organization 
Breached 
Records 
Breached 
Date of 
Breach 
Type of 
Breach 
Source of 
Breach 
Location Risk 
Score 
Target  110,000,000 11/04/13 Financial 
Access 
Malicious 
Outsider 
United 
States 
10.0 
Home Depot 109,000,000 09/02/14 Financial 
Access 
Malicious 
Outsider 
United 
States 
10.0 
eBay 145,000,000 05/21/14 Identity 
Theft 
Malicious 
Outsider 
United 
States 
10.0 
Homeplus 
Co./Tesco PLC 
24,000,000 07/07/14 Identity 
Theft 
Malicious 
Insider 
South Korea 9.5 
AliExpress 300,000,000 12/08/14 Account 
Access 
Accidental 
Loss 
China 9.5 
VTech 
Holdings 
11,686,131 11/14/15 Identity 
Theft 
Malicious 
Outsider 
Global 9.0 
TalkTalk 4,000,000 10/22/15 Identity 
Theft 
State 
Sponsored 
United 
Kingdom 
8.9 
Gaana.com, 
Times Internet 
10,000,000 05/28/15  Identity 
Theft 
Malicious 
Outsider 
Pakistan 8.9 
Rakuten and 
LINE Corp 
7,850,000 04/17/15 Account 
Access 
Malicious 
Outsider 
Japan 8.8 
The ISSRM domain model will now be applied to identify security risk scenarios in the 
order fulfilment process which encompasses the Product catalog process, Shopping cart 
process, Payment process and Shipping process. This activity starts with the identification 
of vulnerabilities (a characteristic of the system assets), the likelihood of threats to exploit 
the listed vulnerability, impact of the threat event, describing how the security event will 
harm the assets (business assets and system asset) and how it negates the security criteria 
and finally, the security risk.  
The domain model shows that security risks arise as a result of the combination of a threat 
with one or more system vulnerabilities which leads to a negative impact that harms at least 
two or more assets [20]. 
4.2 Vulnerabilities in E-commerce Systems 
E-commerce systems, like any other electronic-based system, has within itself various vul-
nerabilities, susceptible to exploitation leading to threats that causes security risks. E-com-
merce system vulnerabilities are inherently the characteristics of the identified system assets 
of the system that can be exploited leading to a security risk. In [20], it is advised that using 
existing knowledge (e.g., vulnerability catalogues) and (previous) expertise will be helpful 
in characterising potential vulnerabilities of considered system assets. There are some vul-
nerability catalogues/databases including the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [25], 
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CWE [5], the US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database [39], OWASP top 10 web applica-
tion vulnerabilities [27] that one could use when developing and protecting software sys-
tems. 
In an article by [41], the vulnerability of a system was revealed to exist at specific entry 
points within the system. Some entry points which an attacker can target in an e-commerce 
system are through the customer, the login interface between the customer and the e-com-
merce website server, the network connection between customer and e-commerce web 
server or the e-commerce web server.  According to [30], finding vulnerabilities depend on 
the nature of the IT system and the stage of the system development. This could be; 
- The design stage, where vulnerability identification should be focused on the 
security policies made, the planned security procedures, the system requirements 
and so on. 
- The implementation stage, where identifying vulnerabilities should be focused on 
specific concerns such as the features of the system as described documentations,  
results of system testing, evaluations of such implementations and so on. 
- The operational stage, where identifying vulnerabilities should include an analysis 
of the specific features of the security system in place, technical and operational 
measures that have already been put in place to protect the system, usage or 
management of the system by personnel, and so on. 
With knowledge of the nature of the system, identification of vulnerabilities is rather easy 
as the scope is narrowed.  
In [20], the vulnerabilities were discussed instead as software flaws or system errors that 
result in a security flaw and thus, security risk. The “Seven Pernicious Kingdom” taxonomy 
discussed in [20] concerning software vulnerabilities was suggested, giving classifications 
of common vulnerabilities in software systems. This classification included [35],  
a. Input validation and representation: This includes vulnerabilities that are specific to input 
and output interfaces on the e-commerce system.  
b. Application programming interface (API) abuse: This includes vulnerabilities specific to 
APIs which are probably under-protected. API abuse categories are common. 
c. Security features: Software security does not mean security software. Chunking together 
security features on topics like authentication, cryptography, and privilege management, 
does not ensure security unless it is done right as it may lead to weak encryption mecha-
nisms or insufficient Transport Layer Protection. 
d. Time and state: These are defects related to unexpected interactions between threads, 
processes, time, and information within a system. 
e. Error handling: This includes vulnerabilities that arise from the manner in which errors 
are handled within the system and how it is displayed.  
f. Code quality: This includes vulnerabilities that arise from poor code quality leading to 
unpredictable behavior and poor usability. 
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g. Encapsulation errors: This includes vulnerabilities that arise from the inability to draw 
strong boundaries around sensitive parts of the application and setting up barriers 
between them. On a Web server, it might mean differentiating between valid 
authenticated data and data that should not be made available to that authenticated 
session. 
h. Environment: As applications run on physical machines or are run by people or external 
processes, the interactions of the application with its environments such as Human (sys-
tem administrator, system users), Physical environment or Third Party associations 
should be considered. 
The taxonomy above is used to classify vulnerabilities in e-commerce systems as shown in 
Table 2. Vulnerabilities listed are classified according to the taxonomy discussed above. 
Table 2: Taxonomy of Vulnerabilities 
Taxonomy Affected System Asset Vulnerability Examples 
Input validation and rep-
resentation 
Webshop Login Interface 
Webshop Server 
V1: Lack of Input Validation of Webshop 
Login Interface  
Application program-
ming interface (API) 
abuse 
Webshop API V2: Insecurely protected Webshop API  
Security features Webshop server 
 
V3: Improper Output Neutralization for Web-
shop server logs 
V4: Weak username and password combina-
tion  
Time and state Webshop server V5: Origin Validation Error of Webshop 
Server. 
Error handling Webshop server V6: Improper error handling of the Webshop 
server 
Code quality Webshop server V7: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or 
Throttling in Webshop Server 
Encapsulation errors Webshop server V8: Improper Authorization in Webshop  
Environment 
 
Webshop Admin 
 
V9: Use of Insufficiently Random Values for  
sessionID Webshop Server 
 
4.3 Security Threats in E-commerce Systems: STRIDE 
Risks scenarios are developed from the existence of threat events having an impact on the 
concerned system. According to [41], in order to discuss threats in e-commerce, provided a 
model to analyze threat classification. Here threats were classified from two points of view: 
threat agents and threat techniques. In [20], a security threat is an event that is initiated by a 
threat agent using an attack method against one or more system assets by exploiting their 
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vulnerabilities. Current attacks on e-commerce systems such as Webshops are similar to 
typical web applications. By exploring the attacker’s perspective, the nature and existence 
of risks in the system can be analyzed. Also, proper defenses can only be established if the 
attack pattern or method can be predicted. The CAPEC’s list of attack patterns [4] is a useful 
collection of specific attack patterns that result in threats relevant to the Webshop example 
and also to e-commerce systems. Out of the total attack patterns listed, nine relevant to e-
commerce systems were collated and categorized. These attack patterns also contain esti-
mations on attack severity, the likelihood of exploitation, technical impact as a result of 
attack motivation-consequences and mitigation, helpful when carrying out risk measure-
ment activities.  
The STRIDE threat modeling, introduced by [33] which helps to find, recognize and model 
these threats on a system has been known to be easy to use, produce a significant number of 
threats for analysis and result in the relatively high number of the correctly determined se-
curity threats [20] and will be applied in this research to derive security threats in e-com-
merce systems. It is the responsibility of those performing threat modeling and analysis to 
discover and describe the threats and attack vectors, within the unique context of a system 
under analysis. Table 3 illustrates a list of threats according to the STRIDE approach. Each 
of these threat scenarios is labelled according to their threat type. 
4.4 Security Impact of Threats on E-commerce Systems 
The combination of threat and the vulnerabilities of the system assets help to represent the 
event of the risk and the consequence of the risk known as impact. The impact essentially 
means that a threat agent was able to use the attack method and exploit system vulnerabili-
ties and is typically seen as some appearance of strange files or programs, automatic sending 
of emails or messages, and system misbehaviour. These actions negate the confidentiality, 
availability and/or integrity of the business assets [20]. In order to define the impact of a 
threat on the system assets, the following can be specified; 
(i) How security criteria are negated by the threat: This could result in the loss of confiden-
tiality, loss of availability or loss of integrity of assets which can be represented on a discrete 
scale (e.g., low medium, high) 
(ii) The harm to the business assets which could result to considerable financial losses, and 
loss in customer trust and confidence. This could be represented in continuous (e.g., mone-
tary units) or discrete (e.g., high, medium, low) scales. 
(iii) The harm to the system assets reflects the state of the system asset after its vulnerabili-
ties have been exploited which includes bugs and malware infection. This could be repre-
sented same way as the harm to business assets. 
However, for the risk examples in Table 4, the direct negation of security criterion as an 
impact of the threat event is considered, and metrics discussed further in Chapter 6. 
As can be seen in Table 4, the security risks are derived from the combination of the threat 
event and impact of the threat. Each risk scenario is labelled according to its STRIDE cate-
gory. 
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Table 3: STRIDE Approach for E-commerce System Threats 
Threat type Threat Event example E-commerce scenario 
 ST1:  
An attacker with knowledge of 
Webshop sets up an Ad on so-
cial media with a malicious 
CSRF script that creates bad 
ratings on product orders using 
the victim’s account 
V5: Origin Validation Error of Webshop Server 
Threat Agent - An attacker with knowledge of Webshop sets up a 
malicious CSRF infected Ad on social media that creates bad product 
ratings on using the victim’s account when clicked. 
Attack method - 1. Have knowledge of Webshop. 
2. Set up a malicious Ad on social media with a malicious CSRF script 
that creates bad product rating on a Webshop product.  
3. Customer clicks on the malicious link. 
4. Bad product ratings are created using victim Customer’s account if 
the customer is already logged in. 
ST2: 
 An attacker compares valid 
sessionIDs provided by Web-
shop and brute forces to access 
a valid Customer session 
V9: Use of Insufficiently Random Values for  sessionID Webshop 
Server 
Threat Agent - An attacker with the means to compare valid ses-
sionIDs and brute forcing to access a valid Customer session. 
Attack Method – 1. Login to Webshop with multiple accounts. 
2. Observe session IDs issued by Webshop server. 
3. Brute force valid session ID and replay generated sessionID. 
4. Customer session is accessed. 
 
TT1:  
An attacker tampers with the 
product price by exploiting the 
insecurely protected Webshop 
API 
V2: Insecurely protected Webshop API 
Threat Agent - An attacker with the means to tamper with the product 
price by injecting malware into the insecurely unpublished protected 
Webshop API. 
Attack method - 1. Scan Webshop server to identify poorly hidden 
Webshop API 
2. Bypass authentication in Webshop API and find the exposed inter-
faces by sniffing to expose interfaces that are not explicitly listed. 
3. Discover unpublished functions 
4. Craft and send malicious calls to include malware that controls 
product price on the Webshop. 
 
RT1:  
An attacker with the means to 
add entries to Webshop server 
logs to obfuscate illegal 
transactions on Webshop by 
exploiting the Improper Output 
Neutralization to Webshop 
server logs 
V3: Improper Output Neutralization for Webshop server logs. 
Threat Agent – An attacker with the means to add entries to Webshop 
server logs. 
Attack Method – 1. Determine Webshop Server log file format by 
checking error messages. 
2. Write a malicious script to provide feedback on log injection pos-
sibility. 
3. Launch various logged actions with malicious data to determine 
what sort of log injection is possible. 
4. Insert script to insert false entries into the log file alongside appro-
priate logging input when possible log injection is found. 
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IT1:  
An attacker with the means to 
extract sensitive customer in-
formation from Webshop stor-
age by sending crafted SQL in-
jection statements through 
Webshop login interface. 
V1 – Lack of input validation of Webshop Login interface 
Threat Agent – An attacker with the means to extract sensitive cus-
tomer information from Webshop storage by sending crafted SQL in-
jection statements through Webshop Login interface. 
Attack method - 1. Go to Webshop. 
2. Identify the vulnerable Webshop Login interface. 
3. Repeatedly send crafted SQL injection statements through Webshop 
login interface. 
4. Observe error message containing customer information from Web-
shop Storage to an unauthenticated malicious user. 
IT2: 
An attacker with the means to 
query Webshop web server for 
common directory names to 
access directory containing 
Customer transaction 
information in Webshop 
Storage. 
V8 – Improper Authorization in Webshop. 
Threat Agent - An attacker with the means to access directory 
containing Customer purchase information in Webshop Storage. 
Attack Method: 1. Login to Webshop. 
2. Send requests to the web server for common directory names. 
3. Sequentially request a list of common base files to each directory 
discovered. 
4. Access sensitive customer transaction information. 
 
DT1:  
An attacker with the means to 
cause an error state in the Web-
shop server 
V6: Improper error handling of the Webshop server 
Threat Agent - An attacker with the means to cause an error state in 
the Webshop server. 
Attack Method – 1. Explore Webshop server info and identify the 
vulnerable component. 
2. Craft/search exploit for component and inject an exploit into Web-
shop server. 
3. Cause server error state by exploiting inadequate error handling 
vulnerability in Webshop server. 
4.  Webshop unable to complete checkout requests. 
DT2: An attacker with the 
means to exhaust Webshop 
checkout service 
V7: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Webshop 
Server 
Threat Agent - An attacker with the means to flood the Webshop 
server with multiple checkout requests and compromise the availabil-
ity of Webshop checkout service. 
Attack Method – 1. Explore Webshop checkout process. 
2. Craft malicious script able to generate more requests than Web-
shop server can handle. 
3. Use this malicious script on Webshop. 
4. Cause exhaustion of resources to perform Webshop checkout ser-
vice. 
 
ET1:  
An attacker with knowledge of 
admin interface address and a 
list of common username and 
password combinations gains 
admin access to Webshop. 
V4: Weak username and password combination 
Threat Agent - An attacker with the means to gain admin access to 
Webshop. 
Attack method - 1. Access JavaScript files for admin interface of the 
Webshop in a browser. 
2. Go to admin login interface and try common usernames and pass-
word combinations. 
3. Access to admin interface successful 
4. Collect customer username and passwords from Webshop Storage. 
5. Privilege escalation successful. 
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Table 4: STRIDE-based Security Risk Impact Analysis 
Threat 
type 
Security Risk Impact analysis 
 SR1:  
An attacker with knowledge of Webshop sets up 
an Ad on social media with a malicious CSRF 
script that creates bad reviews on using the vic-
tim’s account by exploiting the Webserver’s ina-
bility to verify the origin of requests leading to the 
loss of Integrity of Customer feedback ratings. 
Impact: Loss of Integrity of Customer feedback rat-
ing. 
ST1: An attacker with knowledge of Webshop sets up 
an Ad on social media with a malicious CSRF script 
that creates bad ratings on using the victim’s account. 
V5: Origin Validation Error of Webshop Server 
SR2: 
An attacker with the means to compare valid ses-
sionIDs and brute forcing to access a valid Cus-
tomer session by exploiting the weak sessionID 
generated by Webshop Server leading to loss of 
confidentiality of Customer session. 
Impact: Loss of Confidentiality of Customer session. 
ST2: An attacker compares valid sessionIDs provided 
by Webshop and brute forces to access a valid Cus-
tomer session 
V6 – Weak sessionID generation of Webshop Server. 
 TR1:  
An attacker tampers with the product price by ex-
ploiting the insecurely protected unpublished 
Webshop API leading to the loss of Integrity of 
Product prices. 
Impact: Loss of Integrity of Product prices. 
TT1: An attacker tampers with the product price by 
exploiting the insecurely protected Webshop API 
V2 – Insecurely protected Webshop API 
 RR1: 
An attacker with the means to add entries to 
Webshop server logs to obfuscate illegal 
transactions on Webshop by exploiting the Im-
proper Output Neutralization to Webshop server 
logs leading to loss of integrity of Webshop 
process. 
Impact: Loss of Integrity of Webshop server logs 
RT1: An attacker with the means to add entries to 
Webshop server logs to obfuscate illegal transactions 
on Webshop by exploiting the Improper Output Neu-
tralization to Webshop server logs 
V3: Improper Output Neutralization for Webshop 
server logs. 
 IR1: 
An attacker with the means to extract Customer 
information from Webshop storage by sending 
crafted SQL injection statements through Web-
shop Login interface by exploiting the lack of in-
put validation of Webshop login interface leading 
to loss of confidentiality of Customer infor-
mation. 
Impact: Loss of Confidentiality of Customer infor-
mation. 
IT1: An attacker with the means to extract sensitive 
customer information from Webshop storage by send-
ing crafted SQL injection statements through Web-
shop login interface. 
V1: Lack of Input Validation in Webshop Login In-
terface 
IR2: 
An attacker with the means to query Webshop 
web server for common directory names to access 
directory containing Customer transaction 
information in Webshop Storage by exploiting the 
improper authorization in Webshop leading to the 
loss of confidentiality of customer transaction 
information.  
Impact: Loss of Confidentiality of Customer transac-
tion information. 
IT2: An attacker with the means to query Webshop 
web server for common directory names to access 
directory containing Customer transaction 
information in Webshop Storage. 
V8 – Improper Authorization in Webshop. 
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 DR1: 
An attacker with the means to cause an error state 
in the Webshop server and Webshop website 
crashes by exploiting the improper error handling 
of the Webshop server leading to loss of availa-
bility of Webshop website service. 
Impact: Loss of availability of Webshop website ser-
vice. 
DT1: An attacker with the means to cause an error 
state in the Webshop server  
V6: Improper error handling of the Webshop server  
DR2: 
An attacker with the means to flood the Webshop 
server with multiple checkout requests and ex-
haust Webshop checkout service by exploiting the 
Webshop servers allocation of resources Without 
Limits or  Throttling leading to the loss of 
availability of Webshop checkout service. 
Impact: Loss of Availability of Webshop checkout 
service. 
DT2: An attacker with the means to exhaust Webshop 
checkout service  
V7: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or 
Throttling in Webshop Server 
 ER1: 
An attacker gains admin access to Webshop by 
exploiting the fact that Webshop admin uses weak 
username and password combination, leading to 
loss of confidentiality of Webshop Admin 
username and password. 
 
Impact: Loss of Confidentiality of Webshop Admin 
username and password 
Integrity of Webshop product prices 
ST2: An attacker gains admin access to Webshop. 
V4: Weak username and password combination 
 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, a security risk analysis is carried out, following the domain model of the 
ISSRM methodology. This starts out by introducing vulnerabilities as inherent characteris-
tics of the system assets that support the business assets. These vulnerabilities are catego-
rized using the “Seven Pernicious Kingdoms” taxonomy and labelled accordingly to be used 
in threat analysis. Threat analysis was carried out using the proposed STRIDE approach. 
This analysis considers the threat agent and the possible attack methods that exist. It also 
considers how they together, pose a threat to the e-commerce Webshop with each threat 
scenario in their STRIDE category and labelled accordingly. Knowing that elicited threats 
are of no importance if it does not exploit existing vulnerabilities in the system, the risk 
impact was analysed in the event that each elicited threat exploits system asset vulnerabili-
ties leading to a negation of the security objectives of the business assets as well as harm to 
system assets. 
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5 Security Risk Treatment 
This Chapter seeks to answer the RQ3 – What are the risk treatment procedures in risk 
management for an e-commerce system? In order to answer this, the following questions 
are necessary; 
RQ3.1: What is the role of security risk requirements in risk treatment? 
RQ3.2: How can security requirements be applied to treat risk? 
These questions will be discussed to illustrate e-commerce requirements and its elicitation, 
its application in the Webshop business process, and some countermeasure suggestions. 
5.1 E-commerce System Requirements Definition 
Knowing that the security need of an e-commerce system can be defined through the secu-
rity criterion on the business assets (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability), these needs 
should be understood and correlated with the capabilities of the existing technologies [7] to 
make decisions concerning risk mitigations. This is where the application domain and the 
machine domain of an e-commerce system come to play. The application domain in the 
context of an e-commerce system determines the real-world purpose of the e-commerce 
system. Who does it provide service to? What kind of e-commerce service does it provide? 
Who makes sure these services are available? The machine domain, however, consists of 
the workings of the machine/technologies and what they have access to which could include 
data, devices, and applications. When the machine domain is introduced into the application 
domain, it fulfils the needs of the application domain. In this dynamic, aspects of the appli-
cation domain allow analysts to provide proper requirement specifications for the machine 
domain. Security requirements will state the conditions that the machine/technologies are 
required to make true in order that the e-commerce system runs and functions correctly [9]. 
This will not include explicit statements of what needs to be implemented as this only re-
stricts the requirements to technologies. From these requirements, the system developers 
can decide on what needs to be designed to run in order to meet the requirements of the 
application domain. 
5.2 Security Requirements Elicitation 
A security requirement enlists the number of conditions to fulfil to mitigate the risks and 
secure the e-commerce system and business assets. They define what to do to ensure secure 
system access, the privacy of the confidential information, what actions to be carried out to 
survive security attacks, proper system maintenance. For this study, a STRIDE-based secu-
rity requirement elicitation is introduced. Evolving threats may not be foreseen at the point 
of initial requirement elicitation by the security analyst. But with the knowledge of these 
threats, the STRIDE based requirement elicitation method seeks to enforce security require-
ments that have already been developed, improve them, or introduce new requirements that 
will provide a more efficient security risk mitigation. The resources outlined in [20] and 
[26] were used to elicit security requirements for an e-commerce system specific to the risk 
as illustrated in Table 5 in line with STRIDE threat classes discussed in Chapter 3; 
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Table 5: STRIDE-based Security Requirements Elicitation 
Threat 
type 
Risk example Security Requirement 
 SR1:  
An attacker with knowledge of Webshop sets up an Ad on so-
cial media with a malicious CSRF script that when clicked cre-
ates bad reviews on using the victim’s account by exploiting 
the Webserver’s inability to verify the origin of requests lead-
ing to the loss of Integrity of Customer feedback ratings. 
V5: Origin Validation Error of Webshop Server  
SR1.SReq1: The Webshop Server shall 
verify the origin of requests before al-
lowing them to use its functions. 
SR1.SReq2: The Webshop server shall 
protect any state-changing operation. 
SR2: 
An attacker with the means to compare valid sessionIDs and 
brute forcing to access a valid Customer session by exploiting 
the weak sessionID generated by Webshop Server leading to 
loss of confidentiality of Customer session. 
V9: Use of Insufficiently Random Values for  sessionID Web-
shop Server 
SR2.SReq1: The Webshop Server ses-
sionID generation algorithm should be 
brute proof. 
SR2.SReq2: The Webshop shall not 
permit duplicate concurrent user 
sessions, originating from different 
machines 
 TR1:  
An attacker tampers with the product price by exploiting the 
insecurely protected unpublished Webshop API leading to the 
loss of Integrity of Product prices. 
V2: Insecurely protected Webshop API 
TR1.SReq1: The Webshop shall au-
thenticate requests to its API service. 
TR1.SReq2: The Webshop shall not 
rely on lack of discoverability to protect 
privileged functions. 
TR1.SReq3: The Webshop shall pro-
tect itself from infection by scanning 
the entered data. 
 RR1: 
An attacker with the means to add entries to Webshop server 
logs to obfuscate illegal transactions on Webshop by 
exploiting the Improper output neutralization to Webshop 
server logs leading to loss of integrity of Webshop process. 
V3: Improper Output Neutralization for Webshop server logs. 
RR1.SReq1: The Webshop shall verify 
that logs are protected from unauthor-
ized access and modification. 
RR1.SReq2: The Webshop shall verify 
that log output is properly neutralised in 
log entries. 
 IR1:  
An attacker with the means to extract Customer information 
from Webshop storage by sending crafted SQL injection state-
ments through Webshop Login interface by exploiting the lack 
of input validation of Webshop login interface leading to loss 
of confidentiality of Customer information. 
V1 – Lack of input validation of Webshop Login interface 
IR1.SReq1: The Webshop shall verify 
that input data is canonicalized before 
validation. 
IR1.SReq2: The Webshop Login inter-
face should revalidate input data in the 
parameterized stored procedures. 
IR1.SReq3: The Webshop shall verify 
that it does not output error messages 
containing sensitive data. 
IR1.SReq4: The Webshop shall only 
use parameterized stored procedures to 
query the storage. 
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IR2: 
An attacker with the means to query Webshop web server for 
common directory names to access directory containing 
Customer transaction information in Webshop Storage by 
exploiting the improper authorization in Webshop leading to 
the loss of confidentiality of customer transaction information. 
V8 – Improper Authorization in Webshop. 
IR2.SReq1: The Webshop shall verify 
that file names obtained from untrusted 
sources is canonicalized. 
IR2.SReq2: The Webshop shall verify 
that path data obtained from untrusted 
sources is canonicalized. 
IR2.SReq3: The Webshop shall con-
strain resources to be inaccessible by 
default unless selectively allowed. 
IR1.SReq4: The Webshop shall only 
use parameterized stored procedures to 
query the storage. 
 DR1: 
An attacker with the means to cause an error state in the Web-
shop server and Webshop website crashes by exploiting the 
improper error handling of the Webshop server leading to loss 
of availability of Webshop website service. 
V6: Improper error handling of the Webshop server 
DR1.SReq1: The Webshop shall en-
sure that errors are gracefully handled. 
DR1.SReq2: The Webshop shall pro-
tect itself from being scanned. 
DR1.SReq3: The Webshop Admin 
patch Webshop components with 
known vulnerabilities. 
DR2: 
An attacker with the means to flood the Webshop server with 
multiple checkout requests and exhaust Webshop checkout 
service by exploiting the Webshop servers allocation of re-
sources Without Limits or  Throttling leading to the loss of 
availability of Webshop checkout service. 
V7: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in 
Webshop Server 
DR2.SReq1: The Webshop Admin 
shall ensure that components have 
limits of scale configured. 
DR2.SReq2: The Webshop Admin 
shall specify acceptable behaviours for 
when resource allocation reaches limits. 
 ER1: 
An attacker gains access to admin interface to make product 
prices free by exploiting the fact that Webshop admin uses 
weak username and password combination, leading to loss of 
confidentiality of Webshop Admin username and password. 
V4: Weak username and password combination 
 
ER1.SReq1: The Webshop Admin use 
a strong password policy. 
ER1.SReq2: The Webshop shall hide 
information about its Admin Interface. 
ER1.SReq3: The Webshop shall limit 
the number of detected attempted ac-
cesses that fail authentication require-
ments to 5 tries. 
 
5.3 Security Requirements Model 
Using the security requirements that have been elicited, these can be applied to the e-com-
merce business process model for order fulfilment developed in Chapter 3 showing where 
the requirements can be introduced. 
Spoofing scenarios have been discussed in previous chapters where it has been illustrated 
how integrity and confidentiality of business assets have been negated by the described 
risks. The first security risk illustrated was SR1 – An attacker with knowledge of Webshop 
sets up an Ad on social media with a malicious CSRF script that when clicked, creates bad 
reviews on using the victim’s account by exploiting the Webserver’s inability to verify the 
origin of requests leading to the loss of Integrity of Customer feedback ratings. This risk led 
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to the elicitation of security requirements SR1.SReq1 and SR1.SReq2 as seen in Table 5. On 
the business process model of the Webshop, each of these security requirements has been 
applied to treat the risk as seen in Figure 10.  The second spoofing security risk to be treated 
is SR2 - An attacker with the means to compare valid sessionIDs and brute forcing to access 
a valid Customer session by exploiting the weak sessionID generated by Webshop Server 
leading to loss of confidentiality of Customer session. The security requirements for this 
case were SR2.SReq1 and SR2.SReq2 as seen in Table 5. These security requirements were 
applied in order to treat the risk as seen in Figure 10. 
Tampering scenarios have been discussed in previous chapters by providing a risk example 
TR1 demonstrating how the integrity of a business asset can be negated. The first security 
risk illustrated was TR1 – An attacker tampers with the product price by exploiting the 
insecurely protected unpublished Webshop API leading to the loss of Integrity of Product 
prices. The security requirements elicitation for this case is TR1.SReq1, TR1.SReq2 and 
TR1.SReq3 applied as seen in Figure 10. 
Repudiation scenario was illustrated in a risk example RR1 – An attacker with the means 
to add entries to Webshop server logs to obfuscate illegal transactions on Webshop by ex-
ploiting the Improper output neutralization to Webshop server logs leading to loss of integ-
rity of Webshop process. The RR1.SReq1 and RR1.SReq2 security requirements were 
elicited and applied as seen in Figure 10. 
Information Disclosure scenarios IR1 and IR2 have been discussed in Table 4. For IR1 – 
An attacker with the means to extract Customer information from Webshop storage by send-
ing crafted SQL injection statements through Webshop Login interface by exploiting the 
lack of input validation of Webshop login interface leading to the loss of confidentiality of 
Customer information. The security requirements elicited to treat this risk were the 
IR1.SReq1, IR1.SReq2, IR1.SReq3 and IR1.SReq4. These were applied as seen in Figure 10. 
The second risk example is the IR2 – An attacker with the means to query Webshop web 
server for common directory names to access directory containing Customer transaction 
information in Webshop Storage by exploiting the improper authorization in Webshop lead-
ing to the loss of confidentiality of customer transaction information. The security require-
ments elicited to treat this risk were IR2.SReq1, IR2.SReq2 and IR2.SReq3. 
Denial of Service scenarios DR1 and DR2 have been discussed in Table 4. The first risk 
example DR1 – An attacker with the means to cause an error state in the Webshop server 
and Webshop website crashes by exploiting the improper error handling of the Webshop 
server leading to loss of availability of Webshop website service. The security requirements 
DR1.SReq1, DR1.SReq2 and DR1.SReq3, were elicited and applied in Figure 10. The second 
risk example discussed is DR2 – An attacker with the means to flood the Webshop server 
with multiple checkout requests and exhaust Webshop checkout service by exploiting the 
Webshop servers allocation of resources Without Limits or Throttling leading to the loss of 
availability of Webshop checkout service. The security requirements DR1.SReq1 and 
DR1.SReq2 were elicited to treat the risk, applied in Figure 10. 
Elevation of privileges risk example is labelled ER1 – An attacker gains access to admin 
interface to make product prices free by exploiting the fact that Webshop admin uses weak 
username and password combination, leading to loss of confidentiality of Webshop Admin 
45 
 
username and password. The elicited security requirements ER1.SReq1, ER1.SReq2 and 
ER1.SReq3 were applied as seen in Figure 10. 
Figure 11 further illustrates how security requirements can be applied to the login procedure 
of the Webshop order fulfillment process with the goal to mitigate risks within that process.  
5.4 Technical Security Countermeasure Selection 
After requirements elicitation, the selection of countermeasures for the system is done to 
fulfil the elicited security requirements, and thus treat security risks. Security 
countermeasures are the measures taken to counter a possible threat action and should be 
effective as to eliminate the potential of successful threat exploitation. A significant 
challenge during the security risk treatment procedure is to determine the most cost-effective 
and appropriate set of security countermeasures. These when implemented, should mitigate 
risk while complying with security requirements defined by the company complying with 
applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, regulations, policies, directives, or standards as 
concerns the system [1].  
As much as this is a challenge, selecting the most appropriate controls to mitigate risk is a 
task that requires an understanding of the existing systems in place and the business 
priorities. There are standards such as NIST SP 800-53 revision4 [13] that help to assist in 
making the appropriate selection of security countermeasures as well as the concept of 
baseline controls.  
Countermeasures could encompass both the organizational processes of the e-commerce 
system and also, technical tools. An example of an organisational measure is the adoption 
of a secure software development methodology or some security requirements already 
discussed previously [2]. For technical tools,  Microsoft guidelines define an initial list of 
countermeasures for each threat category described by STRIDE [23]. Countermeasure se-
lection should consider the stage of system development and also the existing countermeas-
ures such as the use of unique session per Webshop customer. Although the exact counter-
measure selection for each risk is not within the scope of this research work, this consider-
ation is only helpful to provide estimations for the final risk treatment decision taken by 
business stakeholders. This estimation is known as the cost of countermeasure. Table 6 il-
lustrates some countermeasure suggestions for each STRIDE risk example in line with the 
security requirements elicited for the risk scenario.  
Besides these countermeasure suggestions, some common web application security features 
for web applications should be implemented if not already done. Some of these features 
include but are not limited to a sufficient security policy, HTTP Protection (HTTPS), Fire-
wall Protection, SSL Certificates, and PCI compliance checks.
 
Figure 10: Security Requirements Application to E-commerce Webshop Business Process 
 (This is the structured perspective of the model, low fonts of labels are left intentionally) 
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Figure 11: Security Requirements Application to the Carry Out Login Procedure of Webshop 
 
Table 6: Security Countermeasure Suggestion 
Threat 
type 
Security Requirement Countermeasure suggestions 
 SR1.SReq1: The Webshop Server shall verify 
the origin of requests before allowing them to 
use its functions. 
SR1.SReq2: The Webshop server shall protect 
any state-changing operation. 
Use cryptographic tokens generated at each request. 
Enable optional HTTP Referrer header. 
SR2.SReq1: The Webshop Server sessionID 
generation algorithm should be brute proof. 
SR2.SReq2: The Webshop shall verify that it 
does not permit duplicate concurrent sessions, 
originating from different machines. 
SR2.SReq3: The Webshop shall hide sessionID 
data. 
Use a potent source of randomness with adequate 
length to generate a session ID 
Protect authentication cookies with Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL).  
Design: Make code changes that prevent multiple 
concurrent sessions from different machines. 
 TR1.SReq1: The Webshop shall authenticate re-
quests to its API service. 
TR1.SReq2: The Webshop shall not rely on lack 
of discoverability to protect privileged functions. 
TR1.SReq3: The Webshop shall protect itself 
from infection by scanning the entered data. 
Use OAuth 2.0 authentication protected through 
SSL/TLS. 
Malware scanning solution 
 RR1.SReq1: The Webshop shall verify that logs 
are protected from unauthorized access. 
RR1.SReq2: The Webshop shall verify that logs 
are protected from unauthorized modification. 
RR1.SReq3: The Webshop shall store tamper-
proof records of server logs 
RR1.SReq4: The Webshop shall verify that log 
output is properly neutralised in log entries. 
Design: Make code changes that use input validation 
before writing to the server log. 
Design: Make design code changes that validate log 
data before it is output. 
Implement tamper-proof technologies for web server 
logs 
 IR1.SReq1: The Webshop shall verify that input 
data is canonicalized before validation. 
IR1.SReq2: The Webshop Login interface 
should revalidate input data in the parameterized 
stored procedures. 
IR1.SReq3: The Webshop shall hide infor-
mation about itself outputting error messages. 
IR1.SReq4: The Webshop shall only use 
parameterized stored procedures to query the 
storage. 
Design: Make code changes to implement strong in-
put validation 
Design: Make code changes to use parameterized 
queries or stored procedures 
Design: Use of custom error pages coupled with input 
validation to inform about an error without disclosing 
sensitive information. 
IR2.SReq1: The Webshop shall verify that input 
obtained from untrusted sources is canonical-
ized. 
IR2.SReq2: The Webshop Admin shall con-
strain resources to be inaccessible by default un-
less selectively allowed. 
Design: Make code changes to verify that file names 
and path data obtained from untrusted sources is ca-
nonicalized 
Design: Make changes to ACLs 
Use strong authorization. 
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 DR1.SReq1: The Webshop shall ensure that er-
rors are gracefully handled. 
DR1.SReq2: The Webshop shall protect itself 
from being scanned. 
DR1.SReq3: The Webshop Admin patch Web-
shop components with known vulnerabilities. 
Ensure that sensitive server information is not ex-
posed in the event of being scanned. 
Promptly patch software components. 
Design: Ensure code level error handling mechanisms 
are in place and adequate. 
Replace components that cannot be patched. 
Configure the firewall to block scanning activity. 
DR2.SReq1: The Webshop Admin shall ensure 
that components have limits of scale configured. 
DR2.SReq2: The Webshop Admin shall specify 
acceptable behaviours for when resource alloca-
tion reaches limits. 
DR2.SReq3: The Webshop shall uniformly 
throttle requests. 
Ensure that the protocols used have specific limits of 
scale configured. 
Make code changes to make it more challenging to 
consume resources more quickly than they can be 
freed. 
Use resource and bandwidth throttling techniques. 
 ER1.SReq1: The Webshop Admin implement a 
strong password policy. 
ER1.SReq2: The Webshop shall hide infor-
mation about its Admin Interface. 
ER1.SReq3: The Webshop shall limit the num-
ber of detected attempted accesses that fail au-
thentication requirements to 5 tries. 
 
Alternatively, strong passwords for Admin users can 
be automatically generated. 
Make code changes to limit the number of detected 
attempted accesses that fail authentication require-
ments to 5 tries. 
Make code changes to remove information concern-
ing admin interface. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the concept of security treatment was introduced. This included an 
understanding of security requirements, its meaning and its importance as the listing of 
conditions required to be made true by the system in order to ensure security. The security 
requirements appropriate for each risk scenario were identified and listed. These 
requirements were further applied to the order fulfillment business process model which 
illustrating where these security requirements may apply. Also, suggestions were made on 
possible countermeasures that can be taken (in line with the security requirements) to reduce 
security risk within the risk scenarios. 
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6 Security Risk Measurements 
This chapter seeks to answer further, RQ3 – What are the risk treatment procedures in risk 
management for an e-commerce system? This is done by answering the question; 
RQ3.3: How can security risk be measured for risk treatment implementation? 
This sub-question will illustrate how security risks can be measured for the purpose of risk 
treatment implementation. 
6.1 Security Risk Metrics 
To make the correct response to risk the following parameters need to be taken into account; 
 The cost of responding to risk (i.e. cost of insurance in the case of risk transfer and 
the cost of implementing control measures in the in the case of risk reduction) 
 The importance of the risk to be addressed 
 The effectiveness of the risk response (seen in potential risk reduction level) 
Security risk measurements help to analyze the possible cost of countermeasures selected to 
treat the risk, the potential risk reduction level and make treatment decisions. Security risk 
measurements are done using metrics that estimate the value of the security risk concepts. 
The value metric estimates the security need [20] of each business asset in terms of confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability. This metric expresses the importance and the applica-
tion of the security criterion in regards to the business asset and according to the domain 
model, is an attribute of the security objective.  
The risk is estimated using a risk level metric [20] which depends on the event potentiality 
and the impact level. Because an event comprises of the security threat and vulnerability of 
the system asset, thus the event potentiality can be estimated through the threat likelihood 
and vulnerability level. Risk-treatment can be estimated first in terms of risk reduction per-
formed and then in terms of cost incurred in implementing security controls. The imple-
mentation of these security metrics would result in a qualitative analysis of security risk 
reduction levels of the STRIDE-based risk examples. Business assets can be estimated in 
terms of a value which could be monetary, in hours, and in rate per hour. The value of the 
business asset is used as input to estimate the security need.  
6.2 Security Risk Metric Example 
A security risk example is used to illustrate the security risk metric estimations.  
DR1 - An attacker with the means to cause an error state in the Webshop server and Web-
shop website crashes by exploiting the improper error handling of the Webshop server lead-
ing to loss of availability of Webshop website service. For business asset metric, the 
business asset value of the Webshop checkout service is derived and presented at different 
levels from low to high (1 – 3) as seen in Table 6.  
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Table 7: Business Asset Value 
Business Asset Value: Webshop checkout service 
Value Esti-
mate 
Description 
3 – High  Checkout service should be available 99.9% 
2 – Normal  Checkout service should be available for up to 90% 
1 – Low  Checkout service should be available for up to 80% 
In this next case, the security criterions are considered to find the possible security need for 
the security risk and this is done by carrying out an analysis on the Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability of the Webshop checkout service at different levels (0 – 3). Table 8 shows 
each of these levels and their effects (if any) on the Webshop checkout service business 
asset.  
Table 8: Security Objective Metrics 
Security Objective 
 Need for Confidentiality Need for Integrity Need for availability 
0 No need for confidenti-
ality 
No need for integ-
rity 
No need for availability 
1 - - Checkout service should be avail-
able for up to 80% 
2 - - Checkout service should be avail-
able for up to 90% 
3 - - Checkout service should be avail-
able 99.9% 
The security need(s) of the Webshop checkout service have been defined for the appropriate 
security criterion. With the threats relevant to the system assets concerned with the risk 
(Webshop shopping cart component and Webshop Server) already discussed in the previous 
sections, the threat likelihood can be measured from 1 – Low, 2 – Medium, 3 – High as seen 
in Table 9; 
Table 9: Threat Likelihood 
Threat likelihood 
1 Low likelihood of attacker’s successful implementation of the attack method 
(means, opportunity and competence). 
2 Possible likelihood of the attacker’s successful implementation of the attack 
method. 
3 High likelihood of the attacker’s successful implementation of the attack method. 
The threat is associated with the improper error handling of the Webshop server vulnera-
bility that could be exploited by the attacker The level of vulnerability can be measured 
from 1 – Low, 2 – Medium, 3 – High as seen in Table 10; 
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Table 10: Vulnerability Level of System Assets 
Vulnerability level 
1 Low vulnerability level with appropriate security measures in place to protect 
against risk. 
2 Medium vulnerability level with little security measures in place to protect against 
risk. 
3 High vulnerability level with inadequate security measures in place to protect 
against risk. 
The event potentiality of the risk can be calculated as;  
Potentiality = threat likelihood + vulnerability level – 1 
This is derived from the event matrix of threat likelihood and vulnerability level. The impact 
level of the risk is based on the security need derived from the security criterion of the 
Webshop checkout service. This will be the value of the highest metric for the security need.  
The risk level can then be calculated as ; 
Risk level = risk event potentiality * impact level 
This is derived from the risk matrix of event potentiality and impact level. The cost of coun-
termeasure can be introduced in terms of levels low, medium, high. 
Table 11: Cost of Countermeasure Metric 
Cost of countermeasure 
1 Little or no cost of control implementation in order to treat risk. 
2 Medium cost of control to implement in order to treat risk. 
3 High cost of control to implement in order to treat risk. 
From Table 10, the vulnerability level selected for DR1 is level 3 as there are inadequate 
security measures in place to protect against risk in the event that it occurs. The threat 
likelihood chosen was a level 3 as there is a high likelihood of the attacker’s successful 
implementation of the attack method that leads to successful exploitation of the improper 
error handling of the Webshop server vulnerability. The event potentiality was calculated 
according to the already provided formula and the impact level was chosen as a level 3 
because the highest security need of the concerned security criterion was of a level 3. This 
is illustrated in Table 12. 
The risk metric illustration will be carried out for other risks in the STRIDE Table 4, to 
arrive at Table 13 illustrating the risk metric for risk scenarios before and after risk treat-
ment. The metric calculations remain the same but may differ for business asset value esti-
mations. However, its levels of 3 – high, 2- medium and 1- low, still remain the same. To 
summarize, the risk event potentiality, risk impact level, and risk level metrics are then cal-
culated as follows according to the GQM framework application on the ISSRM domain 
[21]: 
 Risk event = threat likelihood + vulnerability level − 1 
 Impact = maximum value of the security criterion 
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 Risk level = risk event * impact. 
 Maximum-risk level = (3 + 3 − 1) * 3 = 15 
 Minimum-risk level = (1 + 1 − 1) * 0 = 0 
 Risk reduction level = Risk level 1 − Risk level 2 
The minimum risk level obtainable is 0, and the maximum risk level obtainable is 15. These 
specify the boundaries of the risk. Risk level 1 is calculated with no countermeasures to the 
risk in place and then Risk level 2 is calculated with the appropriate security countermeas-
ures applied. The risk reduction level is then calculated with the collated data for the risks 
in Table 4 illustrated in Table 13. 
6.3 Security Trade-off Analysis 
The required effort for risk response (in the case of mitigation or transfer) will likely exceed 
available resources. In this case, some risk trade-off analysis is required. A security trade-
off analysis can be done in this case [21] to place security requirements to be plotted in 
graphs with quadrants offering three possible options labeled as low - 1, medium – 2 and 
high – 3; 
- High (Quick wins): This case includes efficient and effective responses to risks. 
- Medium (Business case to be made): This case includes more difficult responses to 
lower risk that requires careful analysis and management decisions. 
- Low (Deferral): This case includes costly responses to lower risks. 
A trade-off analysis is done based on; 
 the value of the business asset,  
 counter-measure cost and  
 risk reduction level  
The metrics in the last three columns collated in Table 13, were used to create three graphs. 
The first graph is the risk reduction level vs. business asset value, next is the risk reduction 
level vs. cost, and finally the cost vs. business asset value. Each graph is divided into four 
quadrants and the priority on each with each quadrant is illustrated in Table 14: Determining 
Risk Priority. 
In Figure 12: Risk reduction level vs. Business Asset Value, the desired situation is one 
where an asset of high business value has a high risk reduction level value which is identified 
in the quadrat having SR2, TR1, DR1 and ER1 and therefore represents high priority. 
Medium priority risks represent those with high business asset value and low risk-reduction 
level (as seen in risks IR2, RR1, DR2), and those with high risk reduction level and low 
business asset value (as seen in risk IR1). However, the least desired situation, in this case 
are risks with low business asset value and low risk reduction level (as seen in risk SR1). 
  
Table 12: DR1 Security Risk Reduction Level Metric 
Business asset DR1 Security Requirements 
Webshop website 
 service 
An attacker with the means to cause an error state in the 
Webshop server and Webshop website crashes by ex-
ploiting the improper error handling of the Webshop 
server leading to loss of availability of Webshop website 
service. 
DR1.SReq1: The Webshop shall ensure that errors are gracefully handled. 
DR1.SReq2: The Webshop shall protect itself from being scanned. 
DR1.SReq3: The Webshop Admin patch Webshop components with known 
vulnerabilities. 
Before treatment After treatment Risk reduc-
tion level 
Cost of 
counter-
measures Value Security 
need 
Vulnera-
bility level 
Threat 
likelihood 
Event po-
tentiality 
Impact 
level 
Risk 
level 1 
Vulnera-
bility level 
Threat 
likelihood 
Event po-
tentiality 
Risk 
level 
2 
R1 – R2 
 
3 
 
C 0 3 3 5 3 15 1 2 2 6 9 2 
I 0 
A 3 
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Table 13: Risk Metrics Before and After Risk Treatment 
 Business  
Asset  
Value 
Before Treatment After Treatment Risk  
reduction 
level 
Cost of  
counter-
measure Vulnerability 
level 
Threat 
likelihood 
Event      
potentiality 
Impact 
level 
Risk 
level 1 
Vulnerability 
level 
Threat 
likelihood 
Event  
potential-
ity 
Risk 
level 2 
SR1 2 2 3 4 3 12 1 2 2 6 6 3 
SR2 3 3 3 5 3 15 1 2 2 6 9 2 
TR1 3 3 2 4 3 12 1 1 1 3 9 3 
RR1 3 2 2 3 3 9 1 1 1 3 6 2 
IR1 2 3 3 5 3 15 1 2 1 3 12 1 
IR2 3 2 3 4 3 12 1 2 2 6 6 2 
DR1 3  3 3 5 3 15 1 2 2 6 9 2 
DR2 3 2 2 3 3 9 1 1 1 3 6 3 
ER1 3 3 2 4 3 12 1 1 1 3 9 2 
 Figure 12: Risk reduction level vs. Business Asset Value 
In Figure 13, the desired situation is one where there is a low countermeasure cost with a 
high risk reduction value, identified by the quadrant having risks SR2, DR1, IR1, ER1 and 
is thus represented as having high priority. Medium priority is found in quadrats having a 
high cost of countermeasure value with high risk reduction levels (as seen in risk  RR1) and 
a low countermeasure cost with low risk reduction value (as seen in risk RR1, IR2). The 
low priority risks can be identified in the quadrant having a high countermeasure cost and a 
low risk reduction level value and is seen in the risks SR1, DR2. 
In Figure 14, the risks of high priority are in the quadrant having low cost of countermeasure 
with high business asset value having risks SR2, RR1, IR2, DR1, ER1. Medium priority is 
found in quadrants having high value business assets with a high cost of countermeasure (as 
seen in risks  TR1, DR2) and a low-value business asset combination with low 
countermeasure cost (as seen in risks IR2). The least desired situation is one of low business 
asset value with a high countermeasure cost as seen in risks SR1. 
Table 14 illustrates the results of the security risk tradeoff analysis derived from combining 
the priority levels of low, medium and high from the graphs of Figure 12, Figure 13 and 
Figure 14 where a value of 3 is assigned to high priority risks, 2 assigned to medium priority 
risks and 1 assigned to low priority risks. When these values are collated from all three 
figures, an overall priority can be estimated that depends on the values of business asset, 
countermeasure cost and risk reduction level. These values in Table 14 are presented in 
order of priority from High to Low. 
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Figure 13: Risk Reduction Level vs. Cost of Countermeasure 
 
 
Figure 14: Cost of Countermeasure vs. Business Asset Value 
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From the collation, the following can be seen; 
- high priority are those with the highest values – 9 (SR2, DR1, ER1),  
- medium priority are those with values 7 (TR1, RR1, IR1, IR2) and  
- low priority are those with values below 7 (SR1, DR2) 
A trade-off analysis table is derived for better risk priority communication. Now, security 
countermeasures for the Webshop can now be implemented using the relevant standards and 
resources as guidance. A security risk re-analysis is advisable although not covered by this 
research work as a two security analysis procedures will be challenging to carry out within 
the time frame. 
Table 14: Determining Risk Priority 
 Business 
Value – Risk 
Reduction 
Level  
Risk Reduc-
tion Level – 
Cost of Coun-
termeasure 
Business 
Value – Cost 
of Counter-
measure 
Priority 
SR2 3 3 3 9 High priority 
DR1 3 3 3 9 High priority 
ER1 3 3 3 9 High priority 
TR1 3 2 2 7 Medium priority 
RR1 2 2 3 7 Medium priority 
IR1 2 3 2 7 Medium priority 
IR2 2 2 3 7 Medium priority 
DR2 2 1 2 5 Low priority 
SR1 1 1 1 3 Low  priority 
 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter goes further to provide guidance on security risk treatment decisions by the 
introduction of security risk measurements. These security risk measurements offer useful 
estimations on the value of business assets, countermeasure cost and the potential risk re-
duction level following a risk treatment decision. Security risk measurements also pave the 
way for useful risk trade-off analysis that help in deciding which risks are of high priority 
to treat first in relation to the other security risks. 
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7 Validation of Security Risk Management Procedure 
This chapter discusses the validation procedure by expert analysis for the thesis work. It 
discusses the expert backgrounds, a description of the procedure, the results of the validation 
done and the threats to validity. Validation is essential for proffering correctness of the thesis 
content and the usefulness of the risk management procedure to the body of knowledge. 
7.1 Expert Background 
The expert participants were purposefully selected based on their experience with each of 
the different stages of the risk management procedure. With the expert’s backgrounds, it 
was expected that they would have the most valuable information and present valuable feed-
back on this thesis research. A total of seven (7) experts took part in this study. These experts 
were IT professionals (2) and those with Business Information technology (5) background. 
Some experts with business IT background had a lot of business analytical background as 
well and qualified to be both in the category of the business analyst as well as the business 
IT. This selection was made in such a way that the results of the validation will as much as 
possible, uphold correctness on both IT and business aspects of this thesis work as seen in 
Figure 15; 
 
Figure 15: Concept of Expert Background for Validation 
The experience of the IT professional experts are as follows; 
Expert 1: QA Team Lead with 10+ years experience with Software development and Testing 
(including 2years experience with e-commerce related software development) 
Expert 2: Development Team Lead with 10+ years experience in Software development 
(including 3years experience with e-commerce related software development) 
The experience of the Business Information technology experts are listed as follows, 
Expert 3: Director of Cybersecurity with 26+ years in IT governance and business IT related 
roles. 
IT 
professional
Business 
analyst
Business 
IT 
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Expert 4: Team Lead for Security Operations Centre with 20+ years experience in IT 
governance and business IT related roles. 
Expert 5: Cybersecurity engineer with 7+ years experience including Business IT 
governance and e-commerce related software development. 
Expert 6: Cybersecurity engineer with 7+ years experience including Business IT and IT 
Infrastructure management. 
Expert 7: Technical product specialist with 4+ years IT experience including business 
process management research.  
Within their expertise, they fulfil high-level professional roles and other managerial roles 
and represent the those of whom this thesis research will be useful to. 
7.2 Description of Validation Procedure 
Each participant was invited via e-mail to participate in the validation procedure of the re-
search work, explaining the thesis goal and providing details about the methodologies, meth-
ods, and procedures used. With each expert, an introduction to the thesis idea and structure 
of work was conducted. This was done by personal meetings, skype meetings and via email 
(sending a summary of work done). This resulted in the decision from each participant to 
continue with the validation procedure based on time constraint and experience with the 
thesis research field. Further discussions took place in multiple physical and Skype 
interviews with each of the participants.  
These interviews addressed the Chapters 3, 4 and 5 from the viewpoint of its 
understandability, structure and flow around three open questions:  
 Is the structure of the procedure understandable?  
 Do you agree with the relevance of the business and system assets, vulnerabilities 
and threats? 
 Do you agree with the models of the Webshop example?  
 Do you agree with the usefulness of the STRIDE approach to security risk 
management taken? 
 Are any specific parts of the security risk management procedure missing?  
During the interview, specific notes were taken including the various opinions, suggestions, 
and recommendations. Some changes were made to explain aspects of the procedure which 
were lacking in relation to other parts, others to the models used to represent the security 
risk management procedure and so on. The goal of the new changes was to represent the 
opinions and ideas expressed by the experts as accurately as possible as it applied to the 
thesis research. 
Finally, another set of meetings were carried out on the figures that were developed for the 
security risk treatment metrics. In these meetings, questions were asked to verify the metrics 
to the following, including if they agreed with it or not: 
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 Business Asset value 
 Security Objective (CIA) value 
 Threat likelihood value 
 Vulnerability value 
 Cost of countermeasure value 
Each of the opinions of the security experts was taken into consideration, and at the end, a 
final thesis research document was generated. 
7.3 Results of Validation Procedure  
This section contains a documentation of the validation results that follow the expert vali-
dation on each step of the risk management procedure from the asset-related concepts to the 
risk-related concepts and then the risk treatment-related concepts of the Webshop. 
7.3.1 Validation of Asset-related Concepts 
The assets-related concepts involved discussions made in Chapter 3 concerning e-commerce 
security assets (business and system assets) related to the scenario of order fulfilment in a 
Webshop as well as the order fulfilment business process model. The open questions were 
asked as explained in the description. The respondents agreed to the fact that the explana-
tions given and relevance of the assets were understood based on the scenario in use. In this 
case, scopes may widen if other processes in the Webshop was considered or if each process 
was expanded further. The BPMN model for the Webshop Order fulfilment process was 
validated for syntactic and logical correctness by the experts. Some corrections were offered 
by Expert 6, stating that “proper labelling of control flows ensures consistency and easy 
readability and understandability of your model”. These corrections were made and sub-
mitted for another review which was successful. The model was also found to be a general 
flow of order fulfilment, with an emphasis made by Expert 1 on the fact that “… based on 
the business design, some order fulfilment processes may vary. But, as the keyword here is 
“generic”, this model is appropriate”. 
7.3.2 Validation of Risk-related Concepts 
The risk-related concepts involved in this validation part involves research made in Chapter 
4 concerning vulnerabilities of the system assets elicited in Chapter 3, the threats that arise 
from the presence of these vulnerabilities, the resulting impact of successful exploitation 
and the resulting security risk to the Webshop. The relevance, understandability, and cor-
rectness of each concept will be considered.  
After a discussion explaining the concepts, the open questions were asked as explained in 
the description. The correctness and relevance of the vulnerabilities were first discussed. 
Here there was an agreement on their relevance, but a disagreement was raised by Expert 4 
concerning the inclusion of threat examples at this stage, stating that “introducing threat 
examples when the concept of threats have not been discussed just confuses those reading”. 
The advice presented was to “stick to the listing of vulnerabilities and not jump into listing 
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threat examples at this stage”. This was corrected in the thesis work as this opinion was 
agreeable. 
Next, the STRIDE threat scenarios were discussed. Here there was also an agreement in the 
logical flow from vulnerability to threat, and the labels that help to connect them easily 
when tracing vulnerability to threat. The procedure was seen to be understandable by the 
experts as Expert 3 had commended that “… the line of thought and the process was easy 
to follow”. Although the business-oriented experts could not fully understand the technical 
details of the threat, the sense of threat was said to be understood by reading the threat 
statement. 
Then the final risk scenarios were discussed. There was an agreement on the relevance of 
the risk scenarios developed, however Expert 1 commented that “… more malicious sce-
narios could have been developed” but he went on to comment that “the risk scenarios here 
are of course still malicious and stand a risk of affecting the Webshop in damaging ways as 
well”. Expert 5, when asked about the level of maliciousness of the risk scenarios, was in-
different to the claim of the scenarios not being malicious enough but also suggested basing 
these scenarios on information from well-known databases such as CAPEC, OWASP and 
CWE [5]. This suggestion was taken into account as these information databases also held 
information vital to the risk measurement procedure.  
The organisation of each risk scenario according to the STRIDE threats listed in the previous 
section was commended as well as the labels developed that helped tracking of each part of 
the risk statement to its corresponding threat and vulnerability. In summary, the STRIDE 
procedure, its presentation and the correctness and relevance of each of the sections were 
agreed with and commended. The suggested corrections were carried out and the final work 
submitted to the experts again for a final review which returned positive feedback. Here no 
models were discussed. 
7.3.3 Validation of Risk Treatment-related Concepts 
The risk treatment-related concepts to be validated includes work done in Chapter 5 con-
cerning the security requirements elicited to mitigate security risk scenarios discussed in 
Chapter 4. The logical and syntactic accuracy of the illustration of these security require-
ments as well as the security risk trade-off analysis procedures is evaluated with the open 
questions asked. 
First, there was an overall agreement on the importance of security requirements in risk 
mitigation as well as an agreement on the security requirements elicited for each risk sce-
nario. However there were some doubts on whether these requirements will undoubtedly 
aid in treating the risks, some suggestions were made on requirements elicited which were 
taken into account. One suggestion was made by Expert 2 concerning security requirement 
dependencies, stating that “… as each requirement per risk scenario is not being imple-
mented on a separate system, each requirement will somehow have relationships to one 
another.” This situation was advised to be considered during requirement elicitation phase. 
Each of the security requirements to be implemented as controls on the system was shown 
including the example model for the carry out login procedure. The experts assessed this 
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model, and there were suggestions made by Expert 4 & 6 to simplify the model. Expert 4 
stressed on the fact that the model had to be “… specific with also the countermeasure im-
plementations on the diagram. Leaving it open for interpretation will not pass across the 
intended message of the application of security requirements because security requirement 
application is the application of actual controls and not the idea of one”. This opinion was 
considered, and the model simplified, corrected and sent for review two more times before 
an agreement was reached.  
In another set of meetings the metric values used for the security risk treatment section was 
discussed. Here, the values assigned to the business assets, security objective, vulnerability 
level, threat likelihood, and the cost of countermeasure were discussed in-depth. For the 
business asset metric, many factors were considered. There was a collective opinion that a 
quantitative value is difficult to come up with as it will involve many things such as average 
sales, customer action on the event of risk, time to recover, normal expected outage time, 
the necessity of the product, if it is a specialised product, and so on. The final decision made 
was suggested by Expert 3 to “… not include any quantitative analysis. With the different 
factors to be considered when carrying out quantitative analysts, this would prove out of 
scope to the research work at hand and will instead raise confusion”. As for the metrics 
relating to vulnerability and threats, a suggestion was made to cross-check these estimations 
with estimations made on credible databases such CAPEC, OWASP or CWE. As regards to 
cost of countermeasure metrics, Expert 6 suggested that “… it would be nice to have an idea 
of the countermeasures considered in this metric. Maybe include an example before and 
then it can be known that as such, this metric could be Low, Medium or High depending on 
the resources available to the e-commerce system”. There were no contentions on the risk 
reduction level as this was as a result of calculations based on vulnerability levels, impact 
and security objective value and as such cannot be subject to opinions at this stage. The 
security trade-off analysis was commended, illustrating what is of high priority. 
The results of the validation brought forth positive feedback. There was a collective agree-
ment on the security risk management procedure and opinions provided on each concept 
were positive as well. The procedure was seen to be understandable, clear, easy to follow 
and relevant to the system. Expert 7 commented that “… using a simulation tool would have 
also been a great addition to the validation procedure”. This was a valuable opinion, but 
with the time constraints at this stage, nothing significant could be done in this regard. 
7.4 Threats to Validity 
The major threat to the validity of this research work is the subjectivity of expert validation 
opinions on the proposed approach. This is because the approach has not undergone live e-
commerce system tests to conclude on its validity so its efficacy may remain subjective until 
implementation of this approach is done. Although there were procedures to carry out this 
approach on a live e-commerce system, doing this would not be productive within the set 
time frame. Also, the experts chosen are knowledgeable in this field and so can provide 
opinion and suggestion feedback that is relevant. 
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The completeness of the open questions asked during the validation procedure was another 
point of doubt that posed a threat to validity. Were the right questions asked? Were the 
questions complete? Were the questions appropriate enough to validate the research proce-
dure?  
Also, as not all of the expert opinions were relayed into refining the proposed approach, a 
threat lies in the fact that the method used to decide what opinion was to be accepted and 
which was to be ignored is still subjective. 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter discusses the validation procedure used in the thesis research. This procedure 
follows expert validation process discussing questions that help to conclude on the rele-
vance, usefulness, and understandability of the STRIDE approach in security risk manage-
ment. The results of the validation procedure were positive with commendations on the sys-
tematic structure of the work done. Many suggestions were offered and although valuable, 
not all could be considered as some were either out of scope or not time efficient.  
Some threats to validity existed which bordered around subjectivity of the views and opin-
ions of the experts as well as doubt on the appropriateness of the validation questions asked 
and the appropriateness of the background of the experts selected. 
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8 Summary of Work 
This final chapter presents a summary of the research work carried out including the limi-
tations of the research, the answer to the research questions for this work, conclusions of the 
research work and some proposals for future work. 
8.1 Limitations of Research 
This research work concentrated on only one type of e-commerce system which is the busi-
ness-to-customer e-commerce system. As explained in the scope, there are other types of e-
commerce systems not considered in this research work. We also concentrate on the order 
fulfilment process of a B2C e-commerce system which limits the business view of the ap-
plicability of the approach. The case-study used for this security risk management process 
was from a generalisation of the concepts of a standard e-commerce system following re-
search on a of popularly used e-commerce systems. 
Also, with the illustration of security metrics for risk treatment, it is acknowledged that such 
metrics are subjective and are highly business specific. The research work only provides a 
general estimation for risk metric values for its calculations. 
8.2 Answer to Research Questions 
The answers to the research questions in this master thesis have been provided as follows; 
Research Question 1: How can relevant assets for an e-commerce system be identified? 
The relevant assets for an e-commerce system are identified by describing and modelling 
the operation of the business processes that aim to achieve the business goal. A study of e-
commerce retail sites was carried out to understand the general flow of the e-commerce 
application and model its business process. The business process selected in this case was 
the order fulfilment process, and a model describing this process was instrumental in reveal-
ing assets of the system. The BPMN modelling language was used to identify and elicit 
assets in an e-commerce system. The process workflow included the Product Catalog pro-
cess, Shopping Cart process, Payment process and the Shipping process which together 
form the order fulfilment process. Using this model, both business assets and system assets 
that support the business assets are illustrated implicitly or explicitly. The assets discovered 
were discussed in Section 3.3 and 3.4. The assets that pose security concerns to the e-com-
merce systems are both the system assets as well as the business assets. The system assets 
are characterised by having vulnerabilities which can be exploited leading to security risks 
in the e-commerce system. These system assets require some countermeasure implementa-
tion to fix the vulnerabilities that they contain. 
The business assets also pose security concerns by their value to attackers as seen in the 
security criterions assigned to each business asset. Thus the assets elicited in Section 3.3 
and 3.4 pose security concerns in an e-commerce system. As illustrated in this thesis work, 
risk management to ensure security in the system is based on the assets that have been iden-
tified and the threats relevant to these assets. If there is no proper asset identification done, 
security risk management procedure will be lacking and have an incorrect scope. Also, with-
out the identification of assets, vulnerabilities cannot be discovered, and thus relevant threats 
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to the system cannot be known. As illustrated in Chapter 3 of the research work, assets listed 
here provided grounds for vulnerability elicitation which continued into the risk analysis 
stage. 
Research Question 2: What are the security threats as well as its resulting risk to an e-
commerce system? 
Security threats to an e-commerce system exist in a wide variety ranging from common web 
application threats to threats specific to customer privacy and transaction safety. These 
threats relevant to e-commerce systems and based on vulnerabilities elicited from the assets 
of the e-commerce system were analysed using a STRIDE approach throughout Chapter 4 
of this research work. The resulting risks were also analysed in this chapter, outlining its 
impact on the e-commerce system. 
The vulnerabilities of assets in an e-commerce system was discussed in section 4.1 based 
on assets discovered in Chapter 3 thereby proving an answer to this question. The STRIDE 
method as illustrated in section 4.2 was used to identify security threats to an e-commerce 
system. Threat identification as seen in this research work is a significant activity for con-
tinuous risk management in an e-commerce system. Security threats and its attack patterns 
change over time even when system assets do not change, and new ways of attacking assets 
are being discovered. Keeping up with all this demands proper and swift threat identifica-
tion. 
The impacts of security threats that result in risks can be illustrated in section 4.4. These 
impacts can be emulated by how security criteria are negated by the threat resulting in the 
loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of the business assets. However, besides the 
direct negation of the security criteria of business assets, other impacts are seen as secondary 
in this research work. 
Research Question 3: What are the risk treatment procedures in risk management for 
an e-commerce system? 
The risk treatment procedures have been discussed all through Chapters 5 and 6 of this 
research work. The role of security risk requirements as a definition of the conditions to be 
fulfilled to ensure a secure system has been discussed in section 5.1 with some illustrations 
of its application to the Webshop business process in section 5.2. Security risk requirements 
are also fundamental to countermeasure selection and implementation as demonstrated in 
sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.  
With the understanding that simultaneously fixing all risk is unrealistic, a security risk met-
ric can be estimated following value estimation of risk concepts using the GQM approach 
as discussed in section 6.2. Risk reduction levels can also be discovered at this stage.  
The risk concepts considered in this metric are; 
 Business Asset value 
 Security Objective (CIA) value 
 Threat likelihood value 
 Vulnerability value 
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 Cost of countermeasure value 
Also, the use of risk trade-off analysis techniques as illustrated in section 6.3, demonstrates 
risks of high, medium and low priority. 
The above three research questions and answers to the research questions come together in 
providing an answer to the main research question of this master’s thesis –  
What procedure can be used to carry out risk management with a focus on evolving 
threats to e-commerce systems? 
A suitable procedure is one that will provide a way to discover threats to an e-commerce 
system and consistently follow up the risk analysis procedure up until the treatment of the 
resulting risks. This is done by the combination of a threat modeling method – STRIDE, 
with the risk management methodology – ISSRM. Here, the ISSRM methodology is com-
plemented with a streamlined introduction of the STRIDE constructs, providing a system-
atic way to carry out continuous risk management from asset identification up unto the treat-
ment of risk. 
8.3 Concluding Remarks 
The idea for this research work was guided by a main research question, “What procedure 
can be used to carry out risk management with a focus on evolving threats to e-commerce 
systems?” Thus, this research work used the ISSRM method and STRIDE approach in the 
identification of business context and assets for an e-commerce system, threat modelling, 
and risk analysis as well as the application of risk treatment procedures. 
In carrying out security risk management, it can be seen that a meaningful continuous secu-
rity risk assessments and treatment decisions in e-commerce systems be carried out in an 
unambiguous and clear manner using business-relevant terms and proffering mutual under-
standing between IT and business stakeholders. This has been illustrated throughout this 
research work with the example of an order fulfilment management process for a Webshop 
case-study. The use of business relatable modelling techniques to illustrate the asset, risk, 
and risk treatment scenarios demonstrates its usefulness to both IT and business stakehold-
ers in enabling enhanced risk communication between parties involved in the risk manage-
ment procedure.  
It was also noticed that this approach is useful for the stages of the e-commerce system 
development cycle and following this approach allowed the introduction of new require-
ments and the improvement of old requirements to the system depending on the phase of 
development. With the use of risk measurement procedures, risk reduction levels can be 
estimated and help with risk treatment decisions provided from a trade-off analysis on the 
resulting risk metric estimations. It can be summarized that this approach to security risk 
management is a relevant approach towards a continuous security risk management cycle 
with emphasis on the evolving threats posed on e-commerce systems. 
68 
 
8.4 Proposals for Future Work 
In the course of this master thesis, some issues have been identified as a proposal for future 
works. Briefly, these issues will be introduced and discussions that provide a background 
for future academic work on these issues will be opened up. 
Even as this research work was not implemented on a live e-commerce system, it simulates 
the behaviour of one in a useful case study illustration based on a survey of e-commerce 
systems. However, there is room for improvement in this case as the viability of this ap-
proach is subjective until otherwise implemented on a live system. 
Also, the e-commerce system type discussed here is the business-to-customer type. This, 
however, is only one of many other e-commerce types, each having its unique assets. Thus 
an analysis of other e-commerce system types is a useful scope extension for this proposed 
approach. 
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